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ABSTRACT
A failure detection filter is applied to the detec-
tion of actuator and sensor failures on a free-free beam.
Computer simulation tests are used to verify the filter
design and study the effect of unmodeled modes on filter
performance.
In actuator tests, the failure signal to spillover
noise ratio was found to be greatest when the filter
bandwidth was 5 rad/sec beyond the input frequency. Ob-
servation spillover, however, was found to vary widely in
tests run under similar conditions (same input frequency
and filter poles) but with different detector gains.
In sensor tests, the maximum signal-to-noise ratio
for varying filter bandwidth depended upon the initial
conditions placed on the unmodeled modes; the performance
was good even for initial amplitudes on the first un-
modeled mode 7.5% of that on the last modeled mode.
Data-sampling tests on filters designed for continu-
ous data processing but employed in a sampled data mode
revealed that adequate filter performance could be
achieved only when the sampling rate was considerably
beyond the natural frequency of the last system mode.
Stability problems were encountered when the filter band-
width became too high relative to the sampling rate.
The failure simulation tests suggest high sampling
rates and sensor post-filtering to deal with the problems
posed by sampling phase lag and observation spillover.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the space shuttle, aerospace engineers
are contemplating the assembly and deployment of some very
large space structures. Some structures under consideration
include antennas and reflectors 100 meters in diameter and
solar power satellites as large as 20 x i0 kilometers. Un-
like the spacecraft of previous decades, these large struc-
tures have little inherent rigidity due to their low mass and
large size. If the natural damping is not somehow increased,
periodic disturbances such as gravity gradient and solar pres-
sure which are close to the low natural frequencies of the
structure will cause large dynamic overstresses that will
eventually tear the structure apart.
The solar power satellite provides a good example of the
types of overwhelming issues one would typically encounter in
designing a control system for a large space structure. In
order to adequately damp the many vibrational modes of the
satellite, hundreds of thrusters and control moment gyros may
be required to supplement passive damping. The system designer
will have to decide how many actuators and sensors to use and
where to place them on the structure. For example, rate gyro
sensors and control moment gyros could be located almost any-
where on a truss-like structure. The control engineer will
then have to decide what kind of control law to implement in
order to maintain satisfactory structural rigidity. Obviously,
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the control system cannot incorporate all the structural
modes in its model, so care must be taken when controlling
the disturbance-induced vibrations in the low frequency
modes that the control does not spillover into the higher
frequency unmodeled modes.
One factor which should not be overlooked in either
the design or operation of the control system is the likeli-
hood of some failures among actuators and sensors. For ex-
ample, if the interval between maintenance visits is three
years and the control system utilizes a total of 400 sensors
and actuators each with an exponential distribution of time
to failure with a mean time to failure of I00,000 hours, the
expected number of failures in this interval is 92, and the
probability that there will be no failures is 2 x 10-46 .
Thus even with a very optimistic mean time to failure, it
is virtually certain that failures will occur.
One of the major issues in dealing with component un-
reliability in control systems is how to detect a failure
and identify the failed component. This thesis is concerned
with one method of doing failure detection and identification
(FDI).
Many approaches to FDI have been used, the simplest of
which involves triplication of components: a discrepancy be-
tween the signals of two like sensors signifies a failure,
and comparison with the third determines which of the two has
failed. Though simple, this method rapidly becomes costly and
%
even bulky for certain applications.
There are several approaches to FDI which require
specification of failure modes ahead of time, but one which
does not is generalized parity relations. 5 This method uses
sensor data from several time steps to detect failures
rather than data from duplicate sensors at the same time
instant. This approachhas the obvious advantage of re-
quiring fewer components, but it turns out to be very
susceptible to plant disturbances and sensor noise. This
detection routine also performs poorly when there is model
error present, whether it be in the form of modal trunca-
tion or frequency errors.
A closed-loop method, the failure detection filter,
can simultaneously monitor many different types of components,
including sensors, actuators, and dynamic elements of the
system. As with any other observer, the detection filter
incorporates a linear-dynamic model of the system to esti-
mate the true states of the system. Since the model re-
ceives the same control inputs as the true system, the out-
puts of the system and filter will normally match resulting
in an output error of zero. However, when a component fails,
the output error will no longer be zero, signifying that a
failure has occurred. The failed component can then be
identified by the fixed line or plane to which the output
error is restricted by the detection filter.
The failure detection filter was first proposed by
K
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Beard (I) in 1971 for deterministic systems. The theory
was later expanded by Jones (2) to stochastic and sampled-
data systems. Though not strictly valid for sampled-data
systems, the detection filter will behave satisfactorily
for sufficiently high sampling rates. Besides the applica-
tion by Jones to a lateral mode autopilot, the failure de-
tection filter was applied by VanderVelde (8) and Gerard
(9) to the computer control of a guideway vehicle, and by
Meserole (3) to fault-tolerant control of a turbofan engine.
In neither of these previous applications was the filter
designed to detect a sensor failure when the sensor output
was not measuring a state directly. This is also the first
time model error has been introduced into the filter.
The next chapter summarizes the main concepts of
failure detection theory along with an analytic design pro-
cedure for the filter. Chapter 3 proposes a computational
%
design procedure for the deterministic filter based mainly
upon algorithms suggested in Appendix A of Beard (i). In
Chapter 4, simulation results of actuator and sensor failures
in deterministic systems are presented along with some re-
sults on data-sampling. Finally, some conclusions are out-
lined in Chapter 5.
i0
CHAPTER II
FAILURE DETECTION FILTER THEORY
- Detection filter theory is based upon vector-space con-
cepts involving the state estimation errors generated by the
filter following component failures. The major feature of
the failure detection filter is that the output error is small
while the system is functioning normally, and following the
failure of a system component that error is significantly
t
larger and appears only in a single direction or plane--that
direction or plane indicating which component has failed. Thus
the filter provides the basis for both detection of component
failures and isolation of the faulty component. It is not
necessary to specify in advance the possible modes of component
failures.
In this chapter, the structure of the failure detection
filter is first presented along with failure models for both
actuator and sensor malfunctions and plant dynamics changes.
The concept of failure "detectability" will then be introduced
followed by the filter design theory for both fully measurable
systems (rank C=n) and partially measurable systems (rank C<n).
Finally, a two-mode beam example is used to illustrate the
analytic design procedure.
2.1 Detection Filter Structure
The structure of the failure detection filter depicted
in Fig. 2.1 is the same as that of any other state estimation
ii
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Fig. 2.1: Failure detection filter block diagram.
(taken from reference[l])
DH (n-X4i)_
D (n)_
Dp ([4i) rD'e (Z4modi)q----eD'(n-X4i)
D'H (n-Z_)i-Y_modi)
Fig. 2.2: Eigenvalue assignment for detection filter
(number in parentheses indicates the number of
eigenvalues of [A-DC] assigned with that gain).
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filter monitoring a linear time invariant system. The differ-
ence is in the feedback gain D which is designed so that the
output error will be held to a fixed direction or plane depend-
ing upon what component has failed. If D were the Kalman gain,
the filter would minimize the mean square error between the
states x(t) and the filter estimates x(t) when noise is intro-
duced into the system. For the case of an observer, _(t) ap_
proaches x(t) asymptotically since no noise is present.
The system being monitored by the detection filter must
be linear, time-invariant, and observable. The consequences
of unobservability will be pointed out as they are encountered.
In this work, mainly continuous inputs and measurements are
considered.
The system is represented by the linear equations:
where the state vector x(t) has dimension n, the control vector
_(t) has m inputs, and the measurement vector _(t) has p outputs.
The filter incorporates the model:
A
where _ is the filter state vector and _(t) the predicted
measurement vector.
The state and measurement error dynamics are
13
J%
where e(t) _=x(t) - _(t) and _(t) = y(t) - y(t). If the
eigenvalues of A-DC have negative real parts, the steady
^
state error will be zero so x(t) will track x(t). Equation
2.1-3 is valid, however, only when _A,B,C_ of the filter
in (2.1-2) match that of the true system represented by
(2.1-1).
2.2 Failure Models
As mentioned above, (2.1-3) is valid only when the trip-
lets [A,B,C_ characterizing the system and filter match. If
there is a component failure or change in plant dynamics,
(2.1-1) will no longer represent the true system.
Consider an actuator j that has either failed completely
or gone awry. The control vector, u(t), is given by
A
A
where u (t) is the commanded input (and filter input), e_m is
--C
.th 3
a unit vector in the 3 direction of dimension m, and n(t)
is a scalar time-function depending upon the type of failure.
The new state equation becomes
_[kh= A_i_+_i%_ e___i%h (2.2-2)
.th
where bj is the column of B corresponding to the 3 actuator
and _(t) is some scalar time function. If the actuator fails
.th
completely in the off mode, _(t) is simply minus the 3 in-
put, -u (t), and the control effectiveness matrix for the true
cj
.th
system is the same as for the filter except that the 3 column
of B is deleted.
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Subtracting (2.1-2) from (2.2-2), the error equations be-
The vector b. is called the "event vector" because it is the
--3
.th
driving vector in the event of failure of the 3 actuator.
Detection filter theory will show that for any event vector
f, it is possible to find a D such that _(t) maintains a
fixed direction in response to fn(t).
Similarly, consider a sensor failure represented by the
new measurement relation
^ .th
where e is a unit vector in the 3 direction and n(t) is
-Pj
an arbitrary scalar function of time. Complete failure of
•th
the 3 sensor in the zero-output mode is modeled by letting
\
n(t) = - CT x(t), the predicted sensor output, and the measure-
--3 --
ment matrix for the true system is that of the filter with the
•th
3 row deleted.
The new error equations are generated analogously with
(2.2-4) replacing y(t) in (2.1-1):
Unlike the actuator case, the output error in the sensor failure
15
A
mode will have two directions: e due directly to the sensor
--Pj
failure and another component caused by the measurement error
effect in the filter feedback loop. Even though D can be
chosen to make _(t) due to dj unidirectional, this direction
A
will usually not be e , and therefore the output error will
-Pj
span a plane rather than lie in a fixed direction.
Finally, let us consider changes in plant dynamics. Let
..th
the 13 element of A, for instance, change by the amount
_a... The new state equation is:13
(2.2-6)
This model represents the effect of an alteration in the deriva-
tive of xi(t) due to dynamics involving xj(t). The error equa-
tions become
Comparing this with Eq. (2.2-3), we sfiethat the two pairs of
equations have the same form with the scalar time function in
this case being _aijxj(t) and the new event vector as the
.th
n-dimensional I unit vector.
Actuator and plant dynamics failure models are, in fact,
called "input failure models" since both can be represented as
extraneous additive inputs to the system. When the failure
term also appears in the measurement equation [as in Eq. (2.2-5)
for sensor failures], the error equations are referred to as
16
the "measurement failure models." Only the actuator input
and measurement failures will be considered in this work.
2.3 Detection Filter Desi@n
The preceding discussion of failure models motivates the
following definition of "detectability" found in Beard [i]:
The event associated with the vector f in the state error
equation
is "detectable" if there exists a gain matrix D such that:
(i) Ce (t) maintains a fixed direction in the output space
--p
(_(t) is the settled-out solution of Eq. 2.3-1)
(ii) All the eigenvalues of (A-DC) can be arbitrarily speci-
fied (this condition may be relaxed for fixed but stable
eigenvalues).
If f is detectable, then one can identify the failed com-
ponent by checking the direction of the output error. For a
measurement failure, the definition of detectability must be
revised (see Section 2.3.3) and the output error is confined
to a plane.
In the next several sections, the design of D for both
fully measurable systems (rank C=n) and partially measurable
systems (rank C=n) will be presented. Finding D for the first
case is simple since the state vector x(t) can be solved
uniquely given [(t). However, when the state vector is not
fully measurable, the design of D is much more difficult and
generates the need for a more advanced methodology.
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2.3.1 Fully Measurable Systems
Let NS be the number of sensors or rows of C. To satis-
fy condition (ii) of detectability, choose A-DC to equal - _I
where _ is a positive scalar constant. Then the eigenvalues
of A-DC are all - _ and D is given uniquely by
for rankC=n=NS and nonuniquely as
"D-- C. (2.3-3)
for rankC=n<NS.
For an actuator failure, f = b. and the solution of Eq.
(2.2-3) is
__-_.-_o'_
io
The first term on the right is due to the initial conditions
of the filter and will asymptotically approach zero for O'> 0.
The second term is the driven or settled solution--it comes
about because the filter models the ith actuator as working
properly (u(t) = u (t)) whereas in actuality it is not.
-- --C
Since b. is constant, the settled-out solution is
--l
Therefore, es(t) lies in the direction _i and a settled output
.th
error in the direction Cb. indicates a malfunction of the l
--l
18
actuator.
th
Now consider a failure in the I sensor as modeled by
(2.2-4). Retaining the same choice for A-DC, the solution
to (2.2-5) is
_ ._ [<__ (2.3-6)
The settled output error is given by
%°
Therefore, an output error lying in the plane spanned by CD_i
.th
and _i indicates a failure of the • sensor.
Thus we see that finding D in the fully measurable case
is indeed trivial and given by (2.3-2) for A-DC = -_I. Choos-
ing A-DC = -_I enabled the assignment of eigenvalues directly
and also produced readily identifiable output error directions
for component malfunctions because of the simple form of the
state error transition matrix.
2.3.2 Partially Measurable Systems
Because C is not invertible in partially measurable sys-
tems, D cannot be solved by a simple relation like (2.3-2). What
this means physically is that when an event occurs, an actuator
failure for instance, the output error which results will not
be uniquely associated with the state error caused by the
event. Thus since the output error is the only accessible
19
signal, D will not be unique in satisfying the conditions of
detectability. It will therefore be necessary to explore
the relation of D to the space spanned by state errors during
an event.
2.3.2.1 Detection Generator
Consider the system equations (2.1-1) for the case of a
single actuator:
From linear systems theory, the controllable space of u(t),
[the space of states which are possible to reach from the
origin using u(t)] is the range space of
The event vector f has a similar meaning with respect to
the error space e(t) of (2.3-1). In this case, the error
space that can be reached in the event of a failure is the
range space of
.... -'_ _ , , - (2.3-9)
or the "detection space" of f. The output error space there-
fore spans CWf, and condition (i) of detectability is satisfied
only if the rank of CWf is i. Any matrix D which satisfies
this condition is called a "detector gain" for f.
Associated with f is another vector also in Wf defined
by the following theorem proven in Beard:
20
Detection generator theorem -
If (i) (A,C) is an observable pair
(ii) rank Wf = k
(iii) rank CWf = 1
Then there exists an n-vector _[in Wf such that
, , : -- C)_ (2.3-10)
and _ _'\ _ _& O
The latter relation in (2.3-10) guarantees that the controllable
space of _[with respect to (A-DC) is of dimension k and so
matches the controllable space of f. Note also that the first
equation in (2.3-10) yields
: [%i
SO the set of vectors [g, Ag,...,Ak-l_Iform a basis for the
controllable space of f.
Since f is the generator of Wf, it can be expressed as
__: _,_. _._,%_..._ _ ;_-,_ (2.3-:2)
where the _i are scalars. Premultiplying by C and using
(2.3-10),
-- % (2.3-13)
If Cf # 0, then c<k # 0, and since the magnitude of _ is not
restricted by (2.3-10), we are free to choose _ = i.
If in general, for some nonnegative integer _,
21
then
Ci___ ---(_ for _--0,..., _-\ (2.3-15)
_-_ O
and g is chosen so that C(k_ --i. The fact that (A,C) is an
observable pair will guarantee that (2.3-14) holds for
_<,k-l. Using (2.3-15) in (2.3-12) yields
_ .. . % (2.3-16)
where _ satisfies (2.3-14).
The n-vector g which satisfies (2.3-10) and (2.3-16) is
called a kth order "detection generator" for f. The detection
generator theorem has shown that as long as (A,C) is an ob-
servable pair, there always exists a detection generator as-
sociated with a detector gain.
2.3.2.2 Detector Gain
1.
The preceding development of the detection generator serves
as a prelude to the following theorem from which D can be found:
Detector gain theorem --
If (i) (A,C) is an observable pair
(ii) rank Wf = k
(iii) rank CWf = 1
and k eigenvalues of [A-DC] associated with Wf
are given by the roots of
22
Then D is a solution of
_-%
_'_---9,%_?_k_ _ _K g_k_ (2.3-18)
where Pi are scalars and _[is a kth order detection
generator for f
Conversely, any D satisfying (2.3-18) is a detector gain
for f and k eigenvalues of [A-DC] associated with
Wf are given by the roots of (2.3-17).
This theorem is perhaps the main result of detection filter
theory and follows mainly from the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem applied
to [A-DC] and invoking (2.3-11).
Premultiplying (2.3-16) by CA_ and using (2.3-10) yields
which when substituted into (2.3-18) gives
where _-- 0 corresponds to the condition C_ _ O. The rest of
the results will be derived for _= 0, but the corresponding
general results can be obtained by simply replacing f by A_f.
The general solution of (2.3-20) is expressible in the
form
where (2.3-21)
'D_,--D'[.-[-_!ICc.__l'c!l"C_!%-_
with q--Dbeing the right side of (2.3-20) and D' an arbitrary
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matrix the same dimensions as D. Dp is the particular solution
of D and satisfies (2.3-20). Therefore, Dp is alone sufficient
to guarantee condition (i) of detectability and specify k
eigenvalues of [A-DC]. DH is the homogeneous solution of D,
i.e., DHC[ = O, and represents the freedom left in D after hav-
ing satisfied (2.3-20). Condition (ii) of detectability will
be satisfied only if the remaining n-k eigenvalues of [A-DC]
can be assigned using D'.
2.3.2.3 Detection Space
Beard proposes the following auxiliary lemma to show that
the remaining eigenvalues of [A-DC] can be assigned (the actual
assignment of these remaining eigenvalues is discussed in Chapter
3):
Auxiliary detector gain lemma --
For A' C' and D'• , given by
- (2.3-22)
The number of eigenva£ues of [A'-D'C'] = [A-DC] that can
be specified by D' is q' = rank M' where
This lemma shows that the total number of eigenvalues of [A-DC]
that can be specified while constraining D to be a detector gain
is k + q'. Therefore, condition (ii) of detectability will be
satisfied only if n = k + q'.
The next lemma shows that M' does not depend upon the par-
ticular detection generator used or its order k even though it
24
appears to through A':
Detection space theorem --
For K defined by
M' is also equivalent to
1 K_ 1 _n-_ (2.3-24)
Since C' and K depend only on A, C, and f, M' is the same
regardless of what detection generator is used. Thus the number
of eigenvalues of [A-DC] that can be specified while constraining
D to be a detector gain is always the same no matter what _ is
used to find Dp. The null space of M' is called the "detection
space" of f and corresponds to the controllable space of f with
respect to [A-DC]_ The dimension of the detection space is
called the "detection order" _ , and a detection generator of
order _ is called the "maximal generator" for f.
The rank of the null space of M' is _= n - q', so if q'
eigenvalues of [A-DC] are assignable using D', then a detection
generator of order k = _ is needed to assign all the eigenvalues
and satisfy condition (ii) of detectability. Beard shows that if
(A,C) is an observable pair, f will have a maximal generator and
it is unique. Thus, the event f is guaranteed detectable if
(A,C) is observable. Beard also shows that although observabil-
ity is necessary to satisfy condition (ii) of detectability, it
is not necessary to satisfy condition (i) if f is in the observable
space. The number of assignable eigenvalues in this case is the
rank of the observability matrix M defined by (2.3-23) without
25
the primes. Therefore, if one is willing to accept n-rank M
unassignable eigenvalues, every observable event is detectable
in this weaker sense for the unobservable pair (A,C).
The following theorem summarizes the conditions for detecta-
bility:
Detectability Theorem --
Every vector in the state space Rn is detectable if and
only if (A,C) is an observable pair.
2.3.3 Sensor Detectability
In deriving (2.2-5), we noted a fundamental difference be-
tween measurement and input failures; whereas an actuator failure
only drives the state error through the event vector bj, a sensor
failure drives the state error through the output feedback term
as well as the event vector d.. Consequently, the best the filter
--3
can do is constrain the output error to a two-dimensional plane.
Even though this was shown only for the fully measurable case,
Beard proves this is true for partially measurable systems as well.
Because the event vector d. is at the discretion of the de-
signer and is not related at all to the sensor itself, the theorems
in the previous sections are not directly applicable. Instead,
.th
the i row of C will be associated with a sensor failure just as
.th
the i column of B was associated with an actuator failure. This
motivates the following modified definition of detectability for
sensor failures:
The ith row of C, _T , is "sensor.detectable" if there
exists a gain matrix D such that:
26
(i) _ (t) is constrained to a 2D-plane (where %(t) is
-p
the settled-out solution of (2.2-5))
(ii) the eigenvalues of [A-DC] can be specified arbitrarily
The following theorem is the sensor counterpart to the
Detectability Theorem:
Sensor Detectability Theorem--
is an observable pair and _iT is linearly inde-If (A,C)
pendent of all the other rows of C, then c.T is sensor de-
tectable.
The filter design procedure for sensors is stated in two
steps which also serve as a basis for the proof of this theorem:
(i) first choose D to be a detector gain for f, by making
it a solution of (2.3-20), where
= _p_ (2.3-25)
(2) then make D' a detector gain for _i with respect to
the pair (A',C')
Before proving the theorem, we first outline two implica-
tions of (2.3-25). First, the existence of _ is guaranteed be-
T
cause £i is linearly independent of the other rows of C (pseudo-
inverse of C exists). Therefore by the detectability theorem,
is detectable. Second, d. is now fixed because (2.3-20) becomes
--l
_ = . %+ % (2.3-26)
where 4 is the detection order of f, and _ is its maximal
generator.
Assume for the moment that d. lies in the observable space
--l
of (A',C') and prove that condition (i) of sensor detectability
27
holds. This assumption plus the detectability theorem guarantee
that the detector gain D' exists for the event di0with respect
to (A' C') Furthermore, C'e' (t) lies in a fixed directionf " _ S
!
where e (t) is the settled-out solution of
--s
= (2.3-271
Since A'-D'C' is equal to A-DC, e' (t) is the settled state error
for the pair (A,C) using the gain D as well. This fixed direc-
tion can therefore be expressed as
= (2.3-28)
where _d is this fixed direction and md(t) is a scalar function
depending upon n(t).
From (2.3-22), C' is given by
_ _ ^ T
= - _?_ _; (2.3-29)
so that
From (2.2-5), the output error is
A
_,_._---"___&_&['_"D _;[n[_% _____[_] (2.3-31)
Since the quantity in brackets is a scalar, _(t) lies in the plane
spanned by _d and --Pe. Beard shows that _ can be broken up into
a component in the^ie direction and the CK]Af direction, where K
--Pi
is given in (2.3-24) and _ is the lowest integer such that
CK]Af _ 0. Thus the output error lies in the plane formed by
A
e and CK_Af.
--Pi
Let us now relax the assumption that di lies in the observable
space of (A'C'). The observability matrix is given by M' defined
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by (2.3-23), so if _i is unobservable, M' _i = _" Therefore,
d. lies in the nullspace of M', or equivalently, in the detec-
--1
tion space of [. As Beard shows, every vector contained in
the detection space of [ has the same detection order and de-
tection space as f, so D is a detector gain for _i as well as
for f (i.e., d. is detectable in the traditional sense). There-
fore, the second step of making D' a detector gain for _i is
unnecessary, and C_(t) will lie in a fixed direction.
Finally, it remains to show that all the eigenvalues of
A-DC are assignable. When making D a detector gain for f,
eigenvalues can be assigned using (2.3-17) since (A,C) is an
• r t
observable pair. If _l is unobservable with respect to (A' C')
then D' is unconstrained, and the remaining n-_ eigenvalues are
°
assignable by the free choice of D' by the auxiliary detector
gain lemma. Now if _i is observable for (A',C'), a total of
only n-rank M' eigenvalues can be assigned while making D' a
detector gain for _i and using D", the auxiliary detector gain
for D' (D' is the auxiliary detector gain for D). The remaining
eigenvalues are _associated with the unobservable space of
(A',C') which coincides with the detection space of [ and have
already been specified by making D a detector gain for [. Thus
all the eigenvalues are assignable.
One last remark helps to simplify the computation of D'.
D' can be made a detector gain for Af instead of _i because
Af _ di(mod E), where E denotes the unobservable space of
(A',C'). This means that the difference Af - d_ilies in E.
With this substitution, the need to compute (2.3-26) is avoided.
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2.3.4 Sets of Events
Up to this point, we have only concerned ourselves with
detectability of a single event. Now consider the set of event
vectors Ifl,...,fr _. The set is considered "mutually detectable"
if there exists a D that satisfies the conditions of detectabil-
ity for all r events. If the set of vectors satisfy
rank CF = r
[ ... , (2.3-32)
with _ defined for each f. as in (2.3-14) then the events arew I t
called "output separable." _wo events are not output separable
if the output error for both events lie in the same direction.
All sets of events considered in this work were output separable.
A necessary and sufficient condition for a set of output
separable events to be mutually detectable is given by the follow-
ing theorem:
Group Detection Theorem
The output separable vectors I_i'''''_r] are mutually
detectable if and only if the sum of the individual detec-
tion orders of the f is equal to the group detection order
--i
given by the dimension of the nul!s_ace_of *_G_''(n-rank MG'),
where MG'is defined as M' in (2.3-24) with _freplaced by F.
The basic outline of the proof proceeds as follows. Since
the set of events [fl,...,fr] are output separable, the events
have nonintersecting subspaces (shown by Heard), and thus _i
eigenvalues can be specified for each f while satisfying
--l
(2.3-20). An additional q_ = rank 'G_'"-=i:......._!ues can be specified
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by free choice of D' Therefore, condition (ii) of detectability
is satisfied if and only if Z _'i = n - qG" If the set is not
mutually detectable, n - qG _-_i eigenvalues cannot be con-
trolled.
2.3.4.1 Actuator Set
The design of the detection filter for a set of actuator
events proceeds as follows:
(I) determine the maximal generator for each _i using (2.3-10)
(2) form F as defined in (2.3-32) and divide the set up into out-
put separable subsets
(3) subdivide the set further, if necessary, until the subsets
are also mutually detectable
(4) solve (2.3-20) for each _i to make D a detector gain for F
while using the PlS to specify _'i eigenvalues
(5) specify the remaining eigenvalues of A-DC using D'
Step 3 is unnecessary if the uncontrollable eigenvalues re-
sulting from nonmutual detectability are satisfactory. Beard
generates an algorithm that aids in finding these fixed eigen-
values and can also expedite step 3.
2.3.4.2 Sensor Set
One design method for a filter detecting sensor failures
proceeds as follows:
each _, determine f° such that Cf. = e where the(1) for
--l -l -Pi
sensors are linearly independent
(2) form F as in (2.3-32) and subdivide into mutually detectable
sets (events are automatically output separable by step I)
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 ormthesetvectors° whereFk1=I 10
is the set resulting from step 2; let A' and C' be defined
as in (2.3-22) with f replaced by Fkl; categorize the Afi
as follows, and remove those events falling under (iii):
|
(ii)
I
(_ let Fk2=Ifl,...,fk !_ be the set resulting from step 3; let
A' and C' be defined as in (2.3-22) with f replaced by
_k2; repeat step 2 with A, C, and f. replaced by A' C'--1 ' '
and the Af. in category (i); remove Af.'s until the Af.
--1 --l --l
are mutually detectable with respect to (A' C', ); if any
Af. are removed, some Af. may move from category (ii) to
--i --l
(i) and mutual detectability with the new members must be
rechecked
(5 solve (2.3-20) for each --lf" in the set Fk3 resulting from
step 4 to make D a detector gain for Fk3 while specifying
_i eigenvalues
(g solve (2.3-20) for each Afi in the set Fk3 to make D' a
detector gain for AFk3 with respect to (A' C'
, ) while
• eigenvalues (_]. denotes the maxi-
specifying Z_/Imod imod
:rumorder a detection generator for Af. can have)
--l
(7 use D" to specify the remaining eigenvalues of
(A'-D'C') = A-DC [D" is to D' as D' is to D in section
2.3.4.1.]
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A few remarks concerning step 3 are in order. If category
(i) is the case, Af. does not lie in the unobservable space
--1
of C' with respect to A' and thus Af. is detectable. For
categories (ii) and (iii), Af. does lie in the unobservable
--1
space so Af. is not detectable; this is of no consequence,
however, if D is a detector gain for Afi as well as --if" as is
the case for category (ii) (see end of Section 2.3.3). The
rank test given in step 3 determines whether the given sequence
of vectors lie in a fixed direction---if they do, category (ii)
applies.
The assignment of eigenvalues in the last three steps
is depicted in Fig. 2.2: _i eigenvalues are assigned using
Dp and n - Z_ i are specified using D'; of <he n -Z4 i,
' ' which
_%)i are assigned using Dp and the res_ using DH
mod
depends on D" (subscripts P and H denote p rticular and
homogeneous solutions, respectively).
2.4 Two-mode Design Example
As a simple example of the analytic design procedure for
the failure detection filter, consider the normal mode equations
where q_r represents the amplitude of the rth mode,LO r its
natural frequency, and G the amplitude of the input u. In ar
single degree of freedom mass-spring system, for instance,q/
2
is just the displacement x and tO is the spring constant k
divided by the mass m.
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In particular, consider the system of equations for
two flexible modes of a beam given in the form (2.1-1):
_, o _ o o o o u,
*1 ,
o o o I '_ 0 0
- _ _ , - (2.4-2)
where force actuators at _I,E2 and translation rate sensors
at _i,_2 are used [_i(xj) represents value of the it!%mode
shape at xj].
To simplify the design procedure, Beard shows that
if the matrix A is replaced by
with _ arbitrary, the detector gain is unaffected. Following
this suggestion, let's replace A by the simpler form
m
0 0 0 0
0 0 O O (2.4-4)
o o -03_ o
34
Now let's proceed to design a detection filter that
can detect failures of either actuator #i or actuator #2.
The two event vectors for this case are E1 and _2' the two
columns of B. If the two actuators are not both at the same
location or placed symmetrically about the center (for a free-
free beam), the directions Cbl and Cb2 will be linearly inde-
pendent and thus output separable. To determine mutual de-
tectability, the detection order for each f must be found.
For an appropriate choice of D, K is found from (2.3-24)
to be equal to _, and C' using (2.3-22) becomes
= (2.4-5)
O Q_ O Q_
where the Ci's are functions of the elements of Cb and C. Now
form
_' O C, O e,q....¢<_.o &
O O O 0 (2.4-6)
0 o o o
The two rows of C' are linearly dependent so that the rank of
M' is 2 and thus the detection order of _ is 2 for both E1 and
_2" Since M_ is the nul! matrix, the group detection order is
four and the events are mutually detectable.
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The maximal generator for f is second order in this
case and so must satisfy the set (2.3-10):
C_-0 (24-7)
If g is represented by [ga gb gc gd]T' the first of (2.4-7) be-
comes
_ 9_._9_-o €24-81
where _ ij is used to denote _i(c£j)" Since we have assumed
linear independence of the sensors,
0 (2.4-9)
and we must accept the trivial solution gb=gd=0. The second
equation in (2.4-7) transforms into
-I
with _i and _2 denoting the nonzero elements of b, and (2.4-9)
guaranteeing existence of the inverted matrix.
All that remains is to solve (2.3-20) with k = 2 for
each event. If _ is chosen for all the filter eigenvalues,
Pl = _2 and P2 = -2_ . The particular solution of D is found
to be
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where _ij denotes _j for bi. [Note that the original A is used
in obtaining this result.]
Since all four eigenvalues have been assigned using
(2.3-20), D=Dp and the design is complete. If the gain were
being designed for only one actuator, the remaining two eigen-
values would have to be assigned by some other means. This
is often not easy to do analytically using determinants, and
is best done computationally using D', especially for higher
order systems.
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CHAPTER III
COMPUTATIONAL DESIGN OF FILTER
For systems of order four and greater, the analytic de-
sign approach outlined in the previous chapter becomes very
cumbersome. The design example was actually a relatively
simple case facilitated by the fact that the same types of
sensors were used and the filter was designed to detect two
events. In most cases, it is not possible to solve for the
detection generator explicitly nor is it possible to assign
all filter eigenvalues using Dp alone (definitely not for
sensor failure events). This chapter will present a design
alternative based upon a process called "orthogonal reduction"
which is best implemented on a computer. All of these algo-
rithms were first proposed by Beard but also appear in Jones
as well.
3.1 Orthogonal Reduction
Many of the processes involved in the filter design involve
finding the rank of a matrix or finding a vector in the null-
space of a certain matrix. The detection generator, for example,
is in the nullspace of M', the detection space of f, and the
detection order is n-rankM'. The orthogonal reduction procedure
is an iterative process which generates a positive semi-definite
matrix, the range space of which coincides with the nullspace
of a given matrix V, N(V).
Let V be an mxn matrix given by
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Fig. 3.1: Flowchart for ORTRED. 
-- [ (3.1-1)
_'m
where v.T are the rows of V. Let_ denote the symmetric matrix
--l
whose range space is to coincide with the nullspace of V. Each
row of V is then tested to see whether it is orthogonal to the
range space of V (the rows of V span N_(V)) by defining the
auxiliary vector
W_; = _-_y; (3.1-2)
If _i _ _' _i is not perpendicular to the columns of _ (_ is
symmetric) and _ is reduced so that w = 0. This is repeated
until the columns of_ , R(_), are all orthogonal to the rows
of V, NI(V).
The reduction algorithm proceeds as follows:
(i) with!'_ i from the previous iteration, form the auxiliary
vector
=Yl
(ii) if w. = 0, set
_i+l =_i
if _i # _' set
T
W.W,
--l--1
i+l =_ i - (3.1-3)
T
W, V.
_ The procedure must begin with _ I positive definite to ensure
remains positive semi-definite and w.Tv. _ 0. The rank of
--l --1
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the matrix is equal to the number of reductions performed.
The algorithm for subroutine ORTRED is presented in Fig.
3.1 with several modifications tailored to the types of matrices
we will be dealing with. First of all, a row can be skipped
in the reduction process if it is known that it is linearly
dependent on the preceding rows. This is especially useful
for matrices such as M' in (2.3-24) which are generated cycli-
cally. When the auxiliary vector for a particular row of M',
(_jT K_)T for example, is zero, then this row is linearly de-
pendent on the preceding rows of M'. Also, the remaining rows
of M' that depend upon £j, (_jT Ki)T for i > _ , are also de-
pendent upon the preceding rows of M'. Thus, after the appear-
ance of the first zero auxiliary vector, the rest of the rows
that depend on c. needn't be considered. [ICODEI(J) is set
--3
equal to one at this termination point.] When the termination
points for all c.'s have been reached, M' is completely reduced.3
ICODE3 and WL are used when computing the maximal generator.
ICODE3 is the row of C associated with the last nonzero auxiliary
vector WL. The arrays IQ and WF are Used when calculating D'.
IQ stores the orders of K associated with the termination points
for each row of C, and WF stores the last nonzero auxiliary vec-
tor for each row.
3.2 Input failure event design
The computation of D for actuators is accomplished by call-
ing three subroutines: SEPDET, DETGEN, and DGAIN. Subroutine
SEPDET first determines whether the events are output separable I
it then determines whether the events are mutually detectable.
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In the process of determining mutual detectability, SEPDET
calls subroutine DETGEN to find the maximal generator for
each event. Finally, subroutine DGAIN is called to calculate-
D using the detection orders and generators from SEPDET. In-
puts to the main program FDFIL (see Appendix A) are the sys-
tem matrix A and its order N, the measurement matrix C and
number of sensors NS, the number of actuators NA, the matrix
of event vectors FALL and number of events NF, and the filter
eigenvalues EV.
3.2.1 Subroutine SEPDET
The flowchart for SEPDET appears in Fig. 3.2. The pro-
gram first computes _i for each fi according to (2.3-14) and
replaces f. by AMf. in FALL and CF. The rank of CF is foundl l
using ORTRED to see whether the events are separable. If
not, the error message 'NOT SEPARABLE' is printed and the
designer must remove the dependent events from FALL and start
again.
Once the events are output separable, the program pro-
ceeds to determine whether the events are mutually detectable.
The matrix M' in (2.3-24) is generated using C' and K for the
full set of events and the rank is found using ORTRED to
determine the group detection order,_G = N - rankM_. The
call to DETGEN yields the individual detection orders _..1
If _G _ _ _i' the events are not mutually detectable, and
one or more events will have to be removed and the process
started over.
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IRKCF-NP ISEP-1 
return  
Fig. 3.2: Flowchart fo r  SEPDET. 
3.2.2 Subroutine DETGEN
This routine will calculate the "maximal" generator
and detection order _ for an event, or alternatively, the
"maximum" generator and its order _mo d if (C,A) is an un-
observable pair. The process is illustrated in Fig. 3.3 and
begins with calculating M' in (2.3-24) for the single event
and then using ORTRED to find the detection order,_=N-rankM '.
The resulting nullspace in this case is the detection space
of f and coincides with the range space of the final_ .
In addition to being in the detection space of _, the
detection generator must satisfy (2.3-10). This is accom-
plished by applying ORTRED to the matrix
[ I
starting with the final _f from the first step. Since C spans
a subspace one dimension greater than C' and the process is
started with !_f which is orthogonal to C', only one row of C
will not be terminated when first encountered. If WL is the
last nonzero auxiliary vector for this row _j, the maximal
generator is given by
g
As stated earlier, if (C,A) is not observable, the detec-
tion generator found in (3.1-5) is not maximal (order is not
_ ), but it is the generator of maximum possible order; this
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CALL ORTRED 
Fig. 3 . 3 :  Flowchart f o r  DETGEN. 
generator will be referred to as the "modified" generator and
has order 4mo d = rank Mk. If (C,A) is an observable pair,
_mod will equal _ . The rest of the algorithm computes the
vector CK _ Af which is one component of the output error for
sensor failures.
3.2.3 Subroutine DGAIN
This subroutine will finally compute the detector gain
D while assigning the filter eigenvalues. The process begins
(see Fig. 3.4) by finding the particular solution of D for
where
and _mod. and _i have already been calculated by SEPDET, Thel
coefficients Pi are found by calling EVAS which computes the
coefficients in (2.3-17) generated by (s-_/m°di where _ is
/
the chosen filter eigenvalue (all are same).
If _-_mod. = n, all eigenvalues are assigned and the de-
l
tector gain is simply Dp. Otherwise, the remaining eigenvalues
must be assigned using D'. Calculating D' is very similar to
the procedure used in calculating D except that instead ofP
using maximal generators, the last nonzero auxiliary vectors
before termination found in reducing _ are used. Jones refers
to this process as "completion of the state space" because one
is assigning eigenvalues associated with that portion of the
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NUL, IIS, 1, ZHPtlUL 
CALL EVAS 13 
F i g .  3 . 4 :  Fl .owchar t  for D G A I N .  
state space not covered by a detection space.
Finding D' begins by applying ORTRED to M_ (M' for the
full set F) to obtain IQ and WF as explained in section 3.1.
D' is then any solution satisfying
where
W ]
qi4o i=-I ..._NS
_ ... ____+ _.;
The wf. are the columns of WL corresponding to the rankC'
z
' ' "correspond to A' C' in (2 3-22) fornonzero qi' and AF, CF , .
the full set F. The coefficients Pij are found by calling
EVAS for qi eigenvalues. One solution of (3.1-6) is simply
the particular solution
/.
The general solution for D is found by applying (2.3-21) to
the full set F.
3.3 Measurement failure event desi@n
The algorithm for sensor filter design does not use any
new subroutines (except SENSOR which calls the routines) but
the order and implementation are different. A schematic for
the sensor design process is given in Fig. 3.5. SEPDET is
called first for (A,C,F) to determine whether the set is
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- SEPDET - _ [.VAt.--
A, C, f. V_ = C[<<_] -'1
NF '
IDET=I > take out NMD fi FALL'
IFAL=I
- DGAIN -
A, C, f_
_i),{ii),Ciiil
> take out cat(iii)--
IDET=I NF'
FALL '
IFAL= 1!
- SEPDET- I
A' ,C',Afi(i) NF2% l
AFALL2
ISEP=I > take out NOS Afi IFAL=2
__ NF '
IDET=I > take out NMD Afi FALL'
IFAL=I
- DGAIN -
D--
A' C' ,Af• 1
- SEPDET -
A, C, f.1b
- DGAIN -
A, C, f.1
D =D 4
pr
D = Dp + Dh
Fig. 3.5: Sensor design process schematic.
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A 
mutual ly d e t e c t a b l e  ( s i n c e  Cf.  = e . ,  i = l,.,.NF, it i s  auto- 
-1 -1 
m a t i c a l l y  s e p a r a b l e ) .  I f  t h e  s e t  i s  n o t  mutual ly  d e t e c t a b l e ,  
even t s  must be removed from F u n t i l  it i s  and NF (no. even t s )  
s e t  accord ing ly  (F must now be i n p u t t e d  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  
program i n s t e a d  o f  being c a l c u l a t e d  i n  SENSORj. 
DGAIN i s  now c a l l e d  t o  c a l c u l a t e  A; (set IAP=l) f o r  use 
i n  computing M;, t h e  observable  space of ( C 1 , A ' )  ( t h i s  has  
been denoted Wo i n  t h e  program). The Aci  a r e  then  genera ted  
( r e c a l l  t h a t  - f  i s  a c t u a l l y  ~ ~ f w h e n  )A+ 0 )  and ca tegor ized  
- 
according  t o  s t e p  3 i n  Sec t ion  2.3;4.2. The f .  corresponding 
-1 
t o  t h e  Af. f a l l i n g  i n  ca tegory  (iii) a r e  then  removed from 
-1 
F, and t h e  p rocess  begins  a g a i n  wi th  t h e  new F and NF u n t i l  
no Af. f a l l s  under (iii). 
-1 
The n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  c a l l  SEPDET f o r  ( A t , C ' , A f . ) .  If  t h e  
-1 
Af. a r e  n o t  s e p a r a b l e ,  t h e r e  i s  no problem s i n c e  we s t i l l  have 
-1 
h 
t h e  o u t p u t  e r r o r  d i r e c t i o n s  e .  from t h e  even t s  ci t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
-1 
between s e n s o r  f a i l u r e s .  Removing t h e  dependent Af. from t h e  set  
-1 
AF1 w e  on ly  need make D t  a d e t e c t o r  g a i n  f o r  t h i s  new s e t  AF2 
/ 
of NF2 even t s .  , [The program can be e a s i l y  modified t o  handle 
t h i s  c a s e  by i n p u t t i n g  AF2 and NF2 i n t o  SENSOR and bypassing t h e  
s t a t ements  NF -NF and AF2=AF.] I f  t h e  Af. a r e  n o t  mutual ly  de- 2- -1 
t e c t a b l e ,  however, t h e  corresponding f  w i l l  have t o  be removed i 
from F and t h e  whole process  r e s t a r t e d  wi th  t h e  new F. 
Once t h e  Af. a r e  sepa rab le /de tec tab le ,  D G A I N  i s  c a l l e d  t o  
-1 
c a l c u l a t e  D '  ( D l  i s  t h e  o u t p u t  D of D G A I N  i n  t h i s  c a s e ) .  SEPDET 
is  r e c a l l e d  t o  r e g e n e r a t e  Ji and g .  f o r  t h e  o r i g i n a l  f .  t o  be 
-1 -1 
used i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  D 
. P *  Now DGAIN i s  c a l l e d  a f i n a l  time f o r  
( A , C , f i )  w i t h  t h e  i n p u t  D '  c a l c u l a t e d  above t o  compute D. 
CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION TO FLEXIBLE BEAM
In demonstrating various control and failure detection
algorithms for large space structures, researchers often use a
long beam or rectangular plate as a typical structural element.
A beam is usually chosen because of its simplicity and resem-
blance to a long truss, though plates find their usefulness in
simulating the closely spaced frequencies of a flat solar array.
in this chapter, the experimental beam at NASA Langley Research
I
Center will be described along with the design of the filter
using the finite element description of the beam. The effec-
tiveness of the filter in detecting failures of force actu_tors
on the beam will then be tested using various input freque'_cies
and filter bandwidths in mismatched filter-system models. A
nosition sensor failure will also be simulated for the case where
-
there is only an initial condition on modal amplitudes present.
The effect of data sampling will also be investigated.
4.1 NASA LaRC Experimental Beam
In all the failure detection simulation tests, the dynam-
ics model and actuator/sensor types and locations were chosen
to correspond to those of the experimental beam at NASA LaRC
to predict the performance of the filter in subsequent tests
using the actual beam. The Langley beam is made of aluminum
<_=0.502 slugs) and is twelve feet long with a 6" x 3/16" cross
, _ection (see reference 4). Actuation is provided by electro-
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Flexure for
Coupling
Strain Cage
Load Cell
Fig. 4.1: End view of NASA LaRC experimental
beam set-up. (taken from reference[4])
TABLE 4.1: Modal frequencies and shapes for
first eight modes of LaRC beam
(taken from reference[4]).
MODAL
MODE SHAPE VALUE
MODE # FREQUENCY
_rad/sec) x=0.5ft x=2.5ft x=6.0ft
1 0 7.06 6.18 4.64
2 0 -5.83 -3.15 1.53
3 11.418 -7.83 -0.60 5.91
4 31.360 6.45 -4.28 0.00
5 61.258 5.07 -6.36 6.90
6 100.900 -3.68 5.31 0.00
7 150.185 -2.27 1.74 6.84
8 209.004 -0.88 -2.70 0.00
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magnetic shakers at four discrete locations along the beam,
and the horizontal deflections are measured by nine Kaman
KD-2300 probes, four of which are colocated with the actua-
tors (see Fig. 4.1). All of the deflections of interest to
us will take place in the horizontal plane of the beam.
Because the beam is supported in a gravity field and
the actuator dynamics are significant, the experimental beam
does not behave exactly as a uniform beam would. Researchers
at Langley have therefore found it'convenient to perform their
structural analysis using a finite element mode. The beam
model consists of 24 sections, each of which is constrained
so that it can translane and rotate in only one degree of
freedom. The SPAR preTram was then used to obtain the natural
frequencies and orthoconal mode shapes for the first ten modes
of the beam (see Fig. 4.2a-h for first eight modes). The SPAR
generated mode shape values at positions 0.5 ft, 2.5 ft, and
6.0 ft from the end of the beam are given in Table 4.1 for the
two rigid body modes (translation and rotation) and first six
flex modes along with the modal frequencies.
4.2 State equations for beam model
In order to obtain the modal equations for the beam, we
begin with the series expansion for the beam displacement
where ._i(_) is an ortl,oaonal set of mode shapes and 'z_f'(t) are
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( a )  
F i g .  4 . 2 :  S P A R  beam m o d a l  f r e q u e n c i e s  a n d  s h a p e s  ( f r e q u e n c i e s  i n  rad/sec).  
( t a k e n  f r o m  r e f e r e n c e [ 4 ] )  
I 
I 
the modal amplitudes. Next substitute this into the governing
differential equation for the undamped beam
where f is the forcing term and m, E, and I are the beam mass
(M) per unit length, modulus, and cross-section inertia, res-
pectively. Assuming the use of m point force actuators,
with _j being the actuator positions and uj(t) the control
magnitudes, one obtains the set of relations
where O0 i is the natural frequency of the ith mode and _i is
normalized mode shape (for _i not normalized, the inputthe
amplitudes must be scaled).
Next, consider casting (4.2-4) in the state-space form
X -- "/, 4- LI. (4 2-5)
where
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where the number of modes has been truncated at N, and the
use of m force actuators at positions _j and p translation
deflection sensors at positions 4. have been assumed.l
4.3 Failure detection filter design for the beam
For all the beam simulations that will appear later
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in this chapter, the actuators and sensors located, at 0.5 ft,
2.5 ft, and 6.0 ft from the end of the beam were used. The co-
location was chosen simply as a matter of convenience, whereas
the sensor located at 9.5 ft was not used since it is not out-
put separable from the one located at 2.5 ft. In order for the
state equations (4.2-5) to be a true representation of the beam,
normalized mode shapes must be used. Thus, the orthogonal mode
shapes in Table 4.1 were normalized according to (L = beam length)
L
o
before being used to compute A, B, and C. The orthogonal mode
shape values at the actuator locations appear in Table 4.3.
For actuator failure detection, it was always possible
to design a filter that could detect a failure of two actuators,
but never for all three. This is because the individual detec-
tion orders are always two, but the group detection order for
the three events is always n (the system order) making the
events nonmutually detectable. The events are always output
separable since the actuators are not symmetrically opposed with
respect to the center of the beam. By extrapolation, it will
be possible to detect up to p-i input failure events with a
single filter where p is the number of position sensors.
The design for sensor failures was made somewhat more
difficult by the fact that when designing for two sensors, it
was found that Afl and Af2 were not output separable, with
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respect to (C',A'). This simply meant that D' only needed
to be made a detector gain for either Afl or Af2 and would
automatically be a detector gain for the other. The rest
of the design proceeded normally resulting in a filter that
could detect two failure events. As in the actuator case,
it was not possible to detect three sensor events with a
single filter.
4.4 Computer simulation of beam
In order to simulate the dynamics of the system and
filter, a fifth order Runge-Kutta integration routine was used.
The step size was always maintained at a sufficiently small
size compared to the period of the highest frequency mode be-
ing simulated in order not to misrepresent the continuity of
the system dynamics. A listing of the beam simulation pro-
gram appears in Appendix B.
The program accepts as input the detector gain D cal-
culated by FDFIL and the nominal system (filter) matrix A,
actuator effectiveness matrix BF, and measurement matrix CF
used in computing D. BS and CS for the system are also init-
ially set equal to the nominal matrices BF and CF, respectiv-
ely. When the failure time, TFAIL, is reached, the column
of BS associated with the failed actuator, or correspondingly,
the row of CS associated with the failed sensor, is zeroed
out to represent a failure in the off position. The values
of BF and CF retain the nominal system values thus creating
the driving term in the state error equation.
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To easily verify whether the steady-state output
error lies in the direction Cb. subsequent to the failure
--1
.th
of the i actuator, the output is transformed so that any
vector lying in the direction Cb. is changed to the direc-
--l
A
tion e . The desired transformation then is
--Pi
where F is the full matrix of event vectors b.. It is
--1
easily verified by direct substitution of (4.4-1) that
^
RCb. = e for i=i,2,3.
--'I"--Pi
Similarly, it would be desirable to transform the
•th
output error for the I sensor event so that an error in
/%
the plane spanned by e and CK_Af. will lie in an easily
--Pi --l
identifiable plane. Fortunately, the use of three sensors
permits a geometrical construction of the desired transforma-
^ CK_A
tion. Consider the plane spanned by eI and w = fl in
Fig. 4.3. This is the plane in which the output error is
constrained to lie in the event of a sensor #i failure.
Now if the xyz coordinate system is rotated counterclockwise
about the x-axis through the angle _ (the angle that the
projection of w on the y-z plane makes with the y-axis), the
_-_ plane coincides with the plane spanned by _I and _.
Thus under the transformation
1 o 0
_= 0 ¢.0_'_S}_" (4.4-2)
o -sinY osY
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Fig. 4.3: Transformation of output error
for sensor #i failures.
-- ' "l I:"i LTF-
Fig. 4.4: Sampled-data system.
6O
Aan error in the plane spanned by £1 and w will have a first
and second component but no third.
In the next two sections, the effect of model error
in the filter and data sampling of the output will be inves-
tigated for the deterministic system. These two effects
will be of the greatest concern in actual tests of the beam
since the filter must necessarily incorporate a truncated
model and data processor capability limits the sampling
frequency. The effect of actuator, sensor, and plant noise
will not be investigated here because they enter the realm
of stochastic filter design which is beyond the scope of
this work. Even after satisfying the requirements of being
a detector gain, there is usually some freedom left in D
that can be used to make the behavior of the detection filter
approach that of the Kalmsn filter. Since no attempt was
made here to optimize D for noisy systems under the constraints
of being a detector gain, results of noise simulations would
not reflect the true capabilities of the detection filter.
4.4.1 Effect of model error
Consider the case where the filter model contains
fewer modes than the system model--this will always be the
case for the actual beam. Let the state and output equations
for the system be
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= -- F-- + hk
_oj olA_ o
(4.4-3)
t,I
and for the filter
,A. A %'_ (4.4--4)
A ^
where the subscripts M and U denote modeled and unmodeled
modes, respectively.
The new state error equations for the modeled modes
are
and the coupled equations for the system and filter become
"T
' (4.4-6)
_,,I= o Ao!o _ . IBo
o-'DC ?AfDUo
The effect of Bu and Cu on the system of (4.4-3) are known
as control and observation spillover, respectively. Spillover
was first pointed out by Balas (7) in his work on active con-
trol of flexible structures. B in (4.4-3) has the effect of
u
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driving the unmodeled modes, and Cu creates an extra driving
term in the state error equation (4.4-5)--however, neither
type of spillover can cause filter instability since the
triangularity of the dynamics matrix in (4.4-6) is preserved.
The first two simulations performed were for a perfectly
matched system and filter (no spillover present) in order to
verify the filter design. The detection filter was set up to
detect a failure of either actuator #i at 0.5 ft from the end
of the beam, or actuator #2 at 2.5 ft. Results for the simu-
lation of failures of both actuators at 1.0 sec are shown in
Fig. 4.5 for a five-mode model and 15 rad/sec filter band-
width. All three actuators were driving the system with an
exponentially decaying sinusoid of the form, e-0"2t sin_ut,
with an input frequency of _ u = 20 rad/sec. The three trans-
formed output errors are plotted on the same graph with the
nonzero-signal in Fig. 4.5a representing the failure signal
A
corresponding to the direction _i and, in Fig. 4.5b, the di-
rection _2" The verification is good to within the number
of significant figures in the detector gain used in the simu-
lation.
The effect of model error is dramatically illustrated
in Fig. 4.6 for failure of the first actuator. Actuators
#1,2,3 were operating at 20, 5, and 50 rad/sec, respectively,
and the filter bandwidth was 15 rad/sec. Figure 4.6a is for
a four-mode filter model and eight-mode system. The failure
signal is not distinguishable from the other signals because
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the unmodeled fifth mode with a natural frequency of 61
rad/sec is being excited heavily by the input frequency of
50 rad/sec. This excitation is much less for the five-
mode filter of Fig. 4.6b since the mode at 61 rad/sec is
now included in the model, and the effect in Fig. 4.6c for
the six-mode filter is barely noticeable. Therefore, one
should include in his model at least the first mode whose
natural frequency lies beyond the highest input frequency.
The results of an eight-mode system/five-mode filter
set of tests for various input frequencies and bandwidths are
shown in Table 4.2. The peak failure signal for actuator #i
is given along with the peak signal-to-noise rationthe peak
noise is the peak signal achieved in direction £2 and _3"
It appears that for a constant filter bandwidth, the perform-
ance of the filter drops off sharply as the input frequency
is pushed farther past the filter poles. This is due to
faster attenuation of the failure signal than the spillover
noise outside the filter bandwidth. For a fixed input fre-
quency, the signal-to-noise ratio reaches a maximum of 45
for a bandwidth of 15 rad/sec and input frequency o_ 5 rad/sec
and a maximum of 36 for a bandwidth of 25 rad/sec and
_= 20 rad/sec. Results for three filter bandwidths and
three input frequencies are plotted in Figs. 4.7 to 4.9.
It is interesting to note than when the input frequency
is being held constant, the trends we are observing are for
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TABLE 4.2:_ Peak failure signals and signal-to-
noise ratios for various input
frequencies and filter bandwidths
in actuator failure tests.
FILTER INPUT FREQUENCY (rad/sec)
POLES
(rad/sec) 5 20 50
*ps +S/N PS S/N PS S/N
5 .0158 16 .00181 4 - -
10 .00595 40 .00150 21 .000284 5
15 .00297x 45 .00119 31 .000255 5
20 .00175 41 .000925 35 .000238 5
25 .00114 35 .000709 36 - -
30 .000804 29 .000562 23 - -
*peak failure signal in 1.5-2.0 sec interval
+peak failure signal divided by peak noise
in other two output directions (1.5-2.0 sec)
Xthe corresponding results with the detector
gain designed for detecting only actuator#1
failures were: PS=O.OOI21,S/N=I.5
TABLE 4.3: Normalized mode shape values at
sensor and actuator locations
(taken from reference[5]).
MODE MODE SHAPE VALUE at
SHAPE x=0.5 ft x=2.5 ft x=6.0 ft
_ 1.00 1.00 1.00- 59 -i 1 0
-1.60 -0.123 1.21
1.32 -0.876 0.00
1.04 -1.30 1.41
-0.753 1.09 0.00
-0.465 0.356 1.40
181 -0 553
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constant control spilloverEhowever, the observation spill-
over coefficient DC in (4.4-5) changes since D and the fil-u
ter poles change. But even if the filter poles are held
constant and D is changed, the effects can be quite dramatic.
For instance, if the detector gain is designed to monitor
failures of just actuator #i instead of both actuators, the
signal-to-noise ratios for O_u = 5 rad/sec between filter
poles of 15 and 20 rad/sec are about two rather than 40 to
50. The failure signal itself, however, is relatively un-
affected.
A set of simulations was also run for detection of
complete failure (zero signal) of the sensor colocated with
actuator #i. Instead of driving the system with actuator
inputs, initial amplitudes were placed directly on the various
modes in order to excite them. Since the output transforma-
tion for the sensor case is a pure rotation of coordinate axes,
the magnitude of the outputs will actually be in feet if
normalized mode shapes are used. Thus, the transformed
output errors have physical significance, whereas their mean-
ing was obscured by the transformation in the actuator case.
The results of the sensor failure simulations for filter
poles at 15 rad/sec and varying initial conditions are given
in Table 4.4 and Fig. i0. In all cases, the two rigid body
modes had no initial conditions, and the amplitudes on the
first three flex modes were 0.12 ft, 0.09 ft, and 0.06 ft,
respectively. The corresponding filter initial conditions
71
TABLE 4.4: Sensor failure results for filter poles at
15 rad/sec and various initial conditions.
I_ITI;_ P_A_OUTPUTSIGNALS(ft)
_PLITUDES(ft)
4o +PsI *Ps2 -PN Xs/N
.0045 .0030 .0015 .317 .561 5.92xi0-_ 95
.0030 .0020 .0010 .317 .561 3 95x10-f 142
.0015 .0010 .0005 .317 .561 1 97xi0-_ 285
.0003 .0002 .0001 .317 .561 3 13x10-_ 1790
0 0 0 .317 .561 5 36xi0-b 105
TABLE 4.5: Sensor failure results for various filter
bandwidths and fixed initial conditions
(_6o=.003ft, q_7o=.002ft, _8o=.001ft).
FILTER PEAK OUTPUT SIGNALS (ft)
POLES
(rad/sec) +PS1 *PS2 -PN x S/N
5 .781 1.191 .00810 147
i0 .491 .800 .00456 175
15 .316 .561 .00395 142
20 .224 .396 .00394 i00
25 .177 .286 .00288 99
30 .144 .211 .00287 74
+
peak signal in direction #i (1.5-2.0 sec)
*same for direction #2m
same for direction #3
Xpeak signal in direction #i and #2 divided
by peak noise in direction #3
72
_-._o .:{s ._o .')s 1.bo I._s ,.£o I._s 2.bo
TIME {SEC)
(b)%o =.0015 ft
m
t. _o .:_s ._{o ."Js I.bo L._.s _.£o L._s 2.Ioo
TIME [SEC]
(c)_/6o=.0003 ft
Figs.4.10a-c: Sensor tests for various initial conditions•
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were all zero. The amplitudes on the three unmodeled modes
(next three flex modes) are given in the table. The failure
A A
signal plane is _i x _2" The model error noise is very sen-
sitive to initial conditions on the unmodeled modes, vary-
ing almost proportionally. The failure signal itself though
is unaffected.
Table 4.5 shows results when the amplitudes on the
three unmodeled modes are held constant at 0.003, 0.002, and
0.001 ft and the filter bandwidth is varied. The signal-to-
noise ratio reaches a peak near I0 rad/sec where the attenua-
tion of the spillover noise relative to the failure signal
is greatest. Between 25 and 30 rad/sec, there was almost no
attenuation of noise whereas there was a 25% reduction in
the failure signal resulting in loss of signal-to-noise
ratio. Plots for several cases appear in Fig. 4.11.
4.4.2 Sampled-data systems
Instead of monitoring a system continuously, it is
usually the case because of computational considerations
that sensor data is taken at regular intervals and the out-
put held constant between sampling periods. This scheme is
depicted in Fig. 4.4 for the detection filter. The switch
at #I closes once every sampling period to receive an up-
date, and the signal stays constant between sampling times.
Switch #2 closes at the same instant switch #i closes, and
k
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is shown in order to emphasize that the output error to
the filter remains constant between sampling updates.
The effect of data sampling on filter performance
in detection of actuator #i failures for filter poles at
15 rad/sec and input frequencies of 20 rad/sec is shown
in Table 4.6. As expected, the signal-to-noise ratio in-
creases with sampling rate, but even at 160 hz, it is
still a long way from the continuous sampling case where
it is 31 (see Table 4.2). As illustrated in Fig. 4.12,
the failure signal remains constant for different sampling
rates, whereas the noise decreases for faster rates.
As a final illustration of data sampling, consider
the case where the sampling rate is held constant at 64 hz,
and filter bandwidth is varied. Table 4.7 shows results
for filter poles between 5 and 20 rad/sec. At 5 rad/sec,
the error signal due to spillover noise reached values
nearly equal to the failure signal. Between i0 and 20
rad/sec the signal-to-noise ratio increased as it did
for the continuous case. Finally, at 25 rad/sec the filter
became unstable because the filter time constants were too
fast for the sampled-error feedback to have a stabilizing
effect. Plots for several cases appear in Fig. 4.13.
It is important to understand that these data-sampling
results are for a case in which the detection filter was de-
signed on a continuous data basis, and then data sampling
6 _,
TABLE 4.6: Data-sampling results for input frequencies
of 20 rad/sec, filter poles at 15 rad/sec,
and various sampling rates.
SAMPLING PEAK OUTPUT ERROR SIGNALS I(.104)
FREQUENCY (hz) +PS *PN2 -PN3 xS/N
50 11.7 3.41 2.21 3.4
64 11.7 2.17 0.70 5.4
96 11.7 1.53 0.43 7.6
160 11.7 1.02 0.25 11.5
TABLE 4.7: Data-sampling results for input frequencies
of 20 rad/sec, 64 hz sampling rate, and
various filter bandwidths.
4
FILTER POLES PEAK OUTPUT ERROR SIGNALS (-10 )
(rad/sec) PS PN2 PN3 S/N
5 17.9 7.49 12.5 1.4
10 14.0 3.53 2.0 4.0
15 ii.7 i.53 0.4 5.4
20 9.3 1.35 0.3 6.8
+peak signal in direction #i (1.5-2.0 sec)
*same for direction #2
-same for direction #3
Xpeak signal in direction #I divided by peak
signal in direction #2 and #3 (1.5-2.0 sec)
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was imposed on the resulting filter. It is possible to
design the failure detection filter on the basis of a
sampled-data description of the dynamics. This protects
against the instability observed in these results, but
data sampling fundamentally limits the ability of the
filter to restrict a continuous failure signature to a
single direction or plane in the output space.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The failure detection filter performs very well in the
context of flexible structure dynamics when the dynamic model
in the filter matches that of the system it is monitoring.
It was found that the filter usually works quite well even
when the description of the system includes modes which are
not modeled in the filter. This perfo-_mance rapidly diminishes,
however, as the input frequencies become close to the natural
frequencies of the unmodeled modes. For a given input fre-
quency, an optimum filter bandwidth for maximum signal-to-
noise ratio usually exists not far beyond the input frequency.
It is not always the case, however, that the filter will
perform satisfactorily in the presence of modeling error.
Sometimes two different detector gains capable of detecting
the same failure event and designed with the same filter poles
will yield grossly different detection performances--in one
case the signal-to-noise ratio might be 50 and in the other
case it might be less by an order of magnitude. This effect
is caused by the direct appearance of the detector gain in
the filter input due to observation spillover, the same
phenomenon encountered when designing control systems for
flexible structures.
The filter worked well for sensor failures, even when
the initial amplitudes on the unmodeled modes were a significant
fraction of those on the modeled modes (up to 7.5% were tested).
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By varying filter bandwidth, it was possible to obtain very
high signal-to-noise ratios for fixed initial conditions.
As expected, satisfactory performance of the filter de-
signed for continuous data processing when used in a sampled-
data mode depended strongly on a very high sampling rate.
Only when the sampling rate reached five times the natural
frequency of the last system mode did the signal-to-noise
ratio surpass i0. As can be anticipated, when the sampling
rate to filter bandwidth ratio is too low, the phase lag
caused by sampling tended to destabilize the system.
These observations bring to mind several suggestions
with regard to both the actual beam experiment and areas for
further study:
(i) To ensure adequate filter performance, it may be neces-
sary to eliminate observation spillover as much as pos-
sible-it might be possible to accomplish this using a
phase lock loopI0 to comb out only the modeled modes
from the output or by reducing the bandwidth of sensor
data (one must be careful in doing this, however, not
to attenuate the failure signal as well).
(2) It may be necessary to use a sampling rate of at least
64 hz in order to get stable and adequate performance
from the filter--this will depend upon the degree of ex-
citation of the higher modes.
(3) Even after specifying D to be a detector gain and assign-
%
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ing all the filter eigenvalues, there is still a lot of
freedom left in D (especially when D is designed to
detect only one event) that could be used to reduce
spillover noise--using this freedom would require a
more analytic approach to solving for D and involve
solving a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations when
assigning eigenvalues.
(4) The whole issue of stochastic failure detection filter
theory has not even been addressed heremthis will be
an additional consideration in designing the filter when
optimizing signal-to-noise ratios in the presence of
plant, actuator, and sensor noise.
/
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APPENDIX A
FILE: FDFIL FORTRAN A VM/SP CONVERSATIONAL MONZTOR SYSTEM
C**_**_**_**_***_*_***_*_*_*_*_**_*_*_***_**_***_FDFO_1_
C FDFO0020
C PROGRAM FDFZL COMPUTES THE DETECTOR GAIN FDFO0030
C OF THE FAILURE DETECTION FILTER FDFOO040
C FOR BOTH ACTUATOR AND SENSOR FAZLURE EVENTS FDFO005O
C FDFO0060
C FDFOO080
C INPUT: N - NUMBER OF SYSTEM STATES FDFO0090
C NS - NUMBER OF SENSORS FDFO0100
C NF - NUMBER OF FAILURE EVENTS FDFO0110
C IFAL - (=I) TO INPUT EVENT VECTORS FOR SENSOR CASE FDFO0120
C (=0) THEN CF=I IS GENERATED FOR ALL SENSORS FDFO0130
C IAS - (=11 FOR ACTUATOR EVENTS FDFO0140
C (=2) FOR SENSOR EVENTS FDFO0150
C EV - FILTER EIGENVALUES FDFO0160
C A - SYSTEM MATRIX FDFO0170
C C - MEASUREMENT MATRIX FDFO0180
C FALL - MATRIX OF EVENT VECTORS FDFO0190
C (COLUMNS ARE EVENTS) FDFO0200
C FDFO0210
C OUTPUT: D -DETECTOR GAIN FDFO0220
C DPR - AUXILIARY DETECTOR GAIN FDFO0230
C MU - ARRAY OF SEPARABILITY ORDERS FDFO0240
C NU - ARRAY OF DETECTION ORDERS FDFO0250
C NUMOD - ARRAY OF MODIFIED DETECTION ORDERS FDFO0260
C I0 - ARRAY OF COMPLETED STATE SPACE ORDERS FDF(_X3270
C CF - MATRIX OF OUTPUT ERROR DIRECTIONS FOR FDFO0280
C ACTUATOR FAILURES (COLUMNS ARE VECTORS) FDFO0290
C CZKLAF - THIS VECTOR AND THE UNIT VECTOR IN THE FDFO0300
C ITH DIRECTION SPAN THE PLANE OF OUTPUT FDFO0310
C ERRORS FOR SENSOR FAILURES FDFO0320
C FDFO0330
C IMSL SUBROUTINES THAT ARE USED: FDFO0340
C VMULFM(A,BoC) - C=A(TRANSPOSE)*B FDFO0350
C VMULFP(A.B,C) - C=A*B(TRANSPOSE FDFO0360
C VMULFF(A,B,C) - C=A*B FDFO0370
C LINV1F(A,AI) - AI=A(ZNVERSE) FDFO0380
C EIGRF(A,EV) - EV=EIGENVALUES(A) FDFO0390
C FDFCK34DO
C FDF(X)420
C FDFO0430
C= THIS IS THE MAIN PROGRAM FOR ACTUATOR EVENT FILTER FDFO0440
C FDFO0450 "
INTEGER NU(IO),ICAT(tO) FDFO0460
REAL OOUT(20,10) FDFO0470
DOUBLE PRECISION FDFO0480
& A(20,20).C(IO.20),FALL(20, IO).CF(IO, IO),G(20,10), FDFO0490
& ZKF(20,20),CPF(IO.20).ZMF(2OO.20),D(20,10), FDFO0500
& DO(20,20),ADC(20,20),WK(440),REVAL(40),REVEC(800), FDFO0510
& DPR(20, IO),AP(20,20),EV.EPS,TOL FDFOO520
CDMPLEX-16 EVAL(20),EVEC(2O,20) FDFO0530
EOUIVALENCE(EVAL(I),REVAL(1)),(EVEC(1,1),REVEC(1)) FDFO0540
DATA 1N,I0/7,8/ FDFOO550
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FILE: FDFIL FORTRAN A VM/SP CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM
READ(IN.IO) N,NS,NF,IFAL,IAS,EV FDFOOS60
READ(IN.20) ((A(I,J),Q'l,16),I=l,16), FDFOOSTO
& ((C(I.j).j=1.16).I=1.8). FDFO0580
& ((FALL(I.j).j=t.8).I=I.16) FOFO0590
10 FORMAT(SIS/El4.4) FDFO0600
20 FORMAT(32(SFlO.3/).I6(8FlO.3/).15(8FlO.3/).8FIO.3) FOFO0610
WRITE(IO.25) N.NS.NF,IFAL.IAS,EV FOFO0620
25 FORMAT('N.'.I2.SX.'NS=',I2.SX.'NF='.I2. 5X.'IFAL'',I2osX. FDFO0630
& ,IAS.,.I2/,EV=,,E14.4/) FDFO0640
WRITE(IO.26) ((A(I.d).d'l.8).I=l.8). FDFO0650
& ((C(I.d).d=l,S),I=l,8), FDFO0660
& ((FALL(I,J).d-I.8),I=I.8) FOFO0670
26 FORMAT(//'A='/S(SFIO,4/)//'C='/8(eFIO.4/)//"FALL='/8(aFIO'4/)) FDFO0680
IF(IAS.EO.2) GO TO 27 FDFO0690
CALL SEPDET(A.C.FALL.N.NF.NS.ISEP.IDET.IDIR.C.CF.G°NU.NUMOD. FDFO0700
& ZKF.CPF,ZMF) FDFO0710
IF((ISEP.EQ.1).OR.(IDET.EQ.1)) GO TO 100 FDFO0720
CALL DGAIN(C,A,EV,G,CF,CPF,NU,NUMOD,N,NF,NS,O,O,OPR, FDFO0730
& ZKF,ZMF,AP,D) FDFO0740
GO TO 28 FDFOO7SO
C FDFO0760
C* CALL THE MAIN PROGRAM FOR SENSOR EVENT FILTER FDFO0770
C FDFO0780
27 CALL SENSOR(C,A,EV,G,NU.CF,CPF,N,NF,NS, FDFO0790
& ZKF,ZMF,FALL,IFAL,IDET,ICAT,D) FDFO0800
00 271 I=1,10 FDFO0810
IF(ICAT(I).EQ.3) STOP FDFO0820
271 CONTINUE FDFO0830
IF(IDET.EO.O) GO TO 28 FDFO0840
WRITE(IO.277) IOET.((FALL(I.d).J=I.4).I=I. 6) FOFO0850
277 FORMAT('IDET=',I1//'FALL='/6(4E14.4/)//) FDFO0860
GO TO 200 FDFO0870
28 CALL VMULFF(O,C,N,NS,N,20. IO.DC,20, IER) FDFO0880
CALL MATSUB(A,DC,20,20,N,N.ADC) FDFO0890
WRITE(IO,29) ((ADC(I.U).U=I.4).I=I, 4) FDFO0900
29 FORMAT('A-OC='/4(4E14.4/)/) FOFO0910
C* VERIFY THE PLACEMENT OF FILTER EIGENVALUES FDFO0920
CALL EIGRF(ADC,N,20.O,REVAL,REVEC,20,WK,IER) FDFO0930
WRITE(IO.30) (EVAL(I).I=I,16) FDFO0940
30 FORMAT('CLOSED-LOOP EVS ARE: "/16(2Ft0.4/)/) FOFO0950
WRITE(IO.40) ((D(I.d).d=l.3).I=l.16) FDFO0960
40 FORMAT('GAIN MATRIX 0='/16(3E16.6/)//) FDFO0970
DO 48 I=I.N FDFO0980
DO 48 J=I,NS FDFO0990
DOUT(I.U)=SNGL(D(I.J)) FOFOIO00
48 CONTINUE FOF01010
WRITE(ll.SO) ((DOUT(I.d).d'I.3).I=I. 16) FDF01020
50 FORMAT{15(3E16.6/),3E16.6) FOF01030
GO TO 200 FDF01040
100 WRITE(IO.1tO) ISEP,IDET FDFOI050
110 FORMAT('THE SYSTEM IS NOT SEPARABLE OR DETECTABLE:'/ FDF01060
& ,iSEP=, I1.10X ,IDET.,.I1) FDFOt070
200 STOP FDF01080
END FDF01090
C FDF01100
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C- SEPDET DETERMINES SEPARABILITY 'AND DETECTABILITY OF EVENTS FDFO1110
C FDFO1120
SUBROUTINE SEPDET(A.C,FALL.N,NF,NS.ISEP,IDET,IDIR,CSYS,CF,G.NU. FDFO1130
& NUMOD,ZKF.CPF,ZMF) FDFO1140
INTEGER MU(10),NU(10).IQ(10).NUMOD(10) FDFO1150
DOUBLE PRECISION FDFO1160
& A(20,20),C(10,20),FALL(20,10),CF(10,10),CPF(10,20), FDF01170
& G(20, IO),ZKF(20,20),ZMF(2OO,20),F(20),CAJ(IO,20). FOF01180
& CA_F(IO),OM(IO, IO).OMSUB(IO. IO).WL(20),WF(20.10), FDF01190
& CFTC(10,20).CFTCF(IO, lO),CFTCFI(lO, tO).WKAR(460), FOF01200
& CFTTI(IO,20),AFALL(20, IO),AFCF(20,20),CFCF(IO,20), FDF01210
& ZMFNUL(20,20).AJ(20,20).ZMFSUB(20,20),FALL2(20,10), FOFO1220
& ZMFSB(10,20),ZMFSB2(10,20),AJ2(20,20),AMUF(20), FDFO1230
& CSYS(10,20),EPS,TOL,CAdEPS,ZKNU1 FDFO1240
DATA EPS,IO/1.D-4.8/ FDFO1250
ISEP=O FDF01260
IDET=O FDFOI270
DO 3 I=I,N FDF01280
00 3 d=I,NF FDF01290
FALL2(I,J)-FALL(I,J) FDF01300
3 CONTINUE FDF01310
DO 20 K=I,NF FDF01320
DO 5 I=I,N FDF01330
F(I)=FALL(I.K) FDF01340
5 CONTINUE FOF01350
MU(K)= 0 FDF01360
CALL MATIO(AJ,20,N) FDF01370
6 CALL VMULFF(C.A_,NS,N.N,10.20,CAJ. 10.IER) FOFO1380
CALL MATVEC(CAd,F,10.20.NS,N,CAdF) FDFOI390
TOL=O.DO FDFO14OO
DO 7 I=I,NS FOFO1410
DO 7 J-1,N FDFOt420
CAJEPS=CAd(IoJ)*EPS FOF01430
TOL=OABS(DMAXt(TOL,CAdEPS)) FDF01440
7 CONTINUE FOFOI450
NZERO= 0 FDF01460
00 10 I=I.NS FDF01470
IF(DABS(CAJF(I)).LT.TOL) NZERO =NZERO+I FDF01480
10 CONTINUE FDF01490
IF(NZERO.NE.NS) GO TO 12 FOFO15OO
MU(K)=MU(K_+I FDFO1510
CALL VMULFF(A.AJ,N,N.N,20.20,Ad2,20,IER) FOFO1520
DO 111=I,N FOFO1530
DO 11J=I.N FDF01540
Aj(i,d)=Ad2(i,d) FDFO1550
11 CONTINUE FOFO1560
GO TO 6 FDFO1S70
12 WRITE(IO,13) K,MU(K) FOF01580
13 FORMAT('K='.I2,SX,'MU=', I2) FOFO1590
CALL MATVEC(AJ,F,20,20.N.N,AMUF) FDFO16OO
DO 15 I=I,N FDF016tO
FALL(I,K)=AMUF(I) FDF01620
CF(I.K)=CAJF(I) FOF01630
15 CONTINUE FOFO1640
20 CONTINUE FDFO1650
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WRITE(IO,205) ((CF(I,d).d'l,3),I=l, 3) FDFO1660
205 FORMAT('CF='/3(3E16.6/)/) FDFO1670
CALL MATID(OM, IO,NS) FOFO1680
CALL ORTRED(CF,10,10,NS,NF,OM,NS,O,OM,OMSUB, FDFO1690
& IRKCF,ICODE3,ZKNUI,WL,IQ.WF) FDFO17OO
WRITE(IO,2OT) IRKCF FDFO1710
207 FORMAT('RANK CF IS ',I2) FDFO1720
IF(IRKCF.EO.NF) GO TO 21 FOFO1730
ISEP=t FOFO1740
WRITE(IO,209) FDFO1750
209 FORMAT('THE EVENTS ARE NOT SEPARABLE') FOFO1760
RETURN FDFO1770
21 CALL VMULFM(CF,C,NS,NF,N,10,10,CFTC,IO,IER) FDFO1780
CALL VMULFM(CF.CF.NS.NF,NF,10. IO,CFTCF,10,IER) FDFO1790
CALL LINV1F(CFTCF,NF,10,CFTCFI,O,WKAR,IER) FDFO18OO
CALL VMULFF(CFTCFIoCFTC,NF,NF,N, IO, IO.CFTTI,10,IER) FOFO1810
CALL VMULFF(A,FALL,N,N,NF,20,20,AFALL,20,IER) FOFO1820
CALL VMULFF(AFALLoCFTTI,N,NF,N,20, IO,AFCF,20oIER) FDF01830
CALL MATSUB(A,AFCF,20,20,N°N,ZKF) FOFO1840
CALL VMULFF(CF,CFTTI,NS,NF,N, IO,10,CFCF,10,IER) FOFO1850
CALL MATSUB(C,CFCF,10,20,NS,N,CPF) FDF01860
CALL MATGEN(CPF,ZKF,IO,20,2OO,NS,N,N,ZMFSB,ZMFSB2,ZMF) FDFO1870
WRITE(IO,303) ((ZKF(I,J),J=I.4).I=I.4), FDF01880
& ((CPF(i,d),d=t.4),i=l,3) FDFOI890
303 FORMAT('ZKF='/4(4E14.4/)//"CPF='/3(4E14.4/)//) FOFO19OO
CALL MATID(ZMFNUL,20,N) FDFO1910
CALL ORTRED(ZMF,2OOo20,NS'N,N,ZMFNUL°NS,O, ZMFNUL'ZMFSUB, FDFO1920
& IRKZMF,ICOOE3,ZKNUI,WL,IQ,WF) FOFO1930
CALL DETGEN(MU,FALL,FALL2,IOIR,CSYS,A,C,N,NS,NF,ZKF,NU,NUMOO°G) FDFO1940
WRITE(IO,315) IRKZMF,(NU(I),I=I,2) FOFO1950
315 FORMAT('IRKZMF=',I2,1OX,'NU1-2=',2IS//) FDFO1960
NUG=N-IRKZMF FDFO1970
INUSUM=O FDFO1980
DO 25 I=I,NF FOFO1990
INUSUM=INUSUM+NU(I) FDFO2OOO
25 CONTINUE FOFO2010
IF(INUSUM.EQ.NUG) GO TO 30 FDFO2020
IDET=I FOF02030
30 RETURN FDFO2040
END FDFO2050
FDF02060C •
C* DETGEN FINDS THE DETECTION ORDER AND GENERATOR FOR THE EVENTS FDFO2OTO
C FDFO2080
SUBROUTINE DETGEN(MU,FALL,FALL2,IDIR,CSYS,A,C,N,NS,NF,ZKF, FDFO2OgO
& NU,NUMOO.G) FDFO21OO
INTEGER MU(IO)°NU(IO).IQ(10),NUMOD(IO),LEXP(10) FDFO2110
DOUBLE PRECISION FDFO2120
& FALL(20.10),A(20,20),C(10,20).CSUB(IO,20), FDFO2130
& G(20,10),F(20),CSF(10),CSFTC(20),CT(20,10), FDFO2140
& ASF(20).ASUB(20,20),ZK(20,20),CP(10,20).ZMP(2OO,20), FDFO2150
& ZMK(2OO,20),ZMKNUL(10.10),CI(20),AMU(20,20), FDFO2160
& WL(20),WF(20.10),ZKF(20.20),ZMPNUL(20.20).ZMKSUB(20,20),FDFO2170
& ZMPSUB(20°20),ZMPSB(IO,20),ZMKSB(IO°20). FDFO2180
& ZMPSB2(10.20),ZMKSB2(10.20),AMU2(20,20). FDFO2190
& AF(20),FALL2(20,10),ZKL(20,20).CZKL(10,20), FDFO22OO
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& CZKLAF(JO),ZKL2(20,20).CSYS(tO,20)oCZKEPS. FDFO2210
& CFTCF,ZKNU1,CIAMUF,EPS,TOL FDFO2220
DATA IO.EPS/8,1.D-4/ FDFO2230
DO 45 K=t.NF FDF02240
DO 5 I=J,N FDFO2250
F(I)=FALL(I.K) FDFO2260
5 CONTINUE FOFO2270
CALL MATVEC(C,F,10.20,NS,N,CSF) FDFO2280
DO 3 I=I,NS FDFO2290
DO 3 d=1,N FDFO23OO
CT(J.I)-C(I.J) FDFO2310
3 CONTINUE FDFO2320
CALL MATVEC(CT.CSF,20, IO,N,NS,CSFTC) FDF02330
CFTCF=O. FDFO2340
DO 10 I=t.NS FDFO2350
CFTCF=CFTCF+CSF(I),,2 FDFO2360
10 CONTINUE FDFO2370
O0 15 I=I.N FDFO2380
CSFTC(I)=CSFTC(I)/CFTCF FDFO2390
15 CONTINUE FDFO24OO
CALL MATVEC(A.F.20.20.N.N.ASF) FDFO2410
DO 17 I=I.N FDFO2420
DO 17 O=I,N FDFO2430
ASUB(I.d)=ASF(I)*CSFTC(d) FDFO2440
17 CONTINUE FDFO2450
DO 18 I=I.NS FDFO2460
DO 18 J=I.N FDFO2470
CSUB(I,d)=CSF(I).CSFTC(d) FDF02480
18 CONTINUE FDFO2490
CALL MATSUB(A,ASUB,20,20,N,N,ZK) FDFO25OO
CALL MATSUB(C,CSUB,IO,20,NS,N,CP) FDFO2510
CALL MATGEN(CP,ZK,10,20,2OO,NS,N,N,ZMPSB,ZMPSB2,ZMP) FDFO2520
CALL MATID(ZMPNUL,20,N) FDFO2530
CALL ORTRED(ZMP,2OO,20,NS*N,N,ZMPNUL,NS,O,ZMPNUL,ZMPSUB, FDFO2540
& IRKZMP,ICODE3,ZKNUI,WL,IQ,WF) FDFO2550
WRITE(IO,206) IRKZMP FDFO2560
206 FORMAT('RANK OF IMP IS ',I2) FDF02570
NU(K)=N-IRKZMP FDFO2580
CALL MATGEN(C,ZK,10,20,2OO,NS,N,NU(K),ZMKSB,ZMKSB2,ZMK) FDFO2S90
CALL 0RTRED(ZMK,2OO,20,NS*N,NoZMPNUL,NS,O,ZMKNUL,ZMKSUB, FDFO26OO
& IRKZMK.ICODE3.ZKNUI.WL.IQ.WF) FDFO2610
NUM00(K)=IRKZMK FDFO2620
WRITE(IO,216) NUMOD(K) FDF02630
216 FORMAT('NUMOO='.I2) FOF02640
DO 20 d=l.N FOFO2650
Ci(d)=C(iC0OE3.d) FDFO2660
20 CONTINUE FDFO2670
CIAMUF=O.DO FDF02680
DO 25 I=I.N FDF02690
CIAMUF=CIAMUF+CI(I)=F(I) FDFO27OO
25 CONTINUE FDFO2710
00 40 I=I,N FDFO2720
G(I.K)=(CIAMUF/ZKNUI)*WL(I) FDFO2730
40 CONTINUE FDF02740
43 WRITE(IO.225) (G(I.K),I=I,4) FDFO2750
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225 FORMAT('G='/4E14.4) FOF02760
IF(IDIR.NE.I) GO TO 45 FDF02770
LEXP(K)=O FDF02780
DO 4411-I,N FDF02790
AF(I)=FALL2(I,K) FDFO28OO
441 CONTINUE FDF02810
CALL MATID(ZKL.20.N) FDFO2820
442 CALL VMULFF(CSYS.ZKL.NS.N.N. IO.20.CZKL.10. IER) FDFO2830
CALL MATVEC(CZKL.AF.IO.20.NS.N.CZKLAF) FDFO284O
TOL=O.DO FDFO285O
DO 443 I=loNS FDF02860
DO 443 _=I,N FDF02870
CZKEPS=CZKL(I.d),EPS FDF02880
TOL=DABS(DMAXI(TOL.CZKEPS)) FDFO2890
443 CONTINUE FDFO29OO
NZER0=O FDFO2910
O0 444 I=I,NS FDF02920
IF(DABS(CZKLAF(I)).LT.TOL) NZERO=NZERO+I FDF02930
444 CONTINUE FDF02940
IF(NZERO.NE.NS) GO TO 446 FDF02950
LEXP(K)=LEXP(K)+I FDF02960
CALL VMULFF(ZK°ZKL,N,N,N,20,20,ZKL2,20, IER) FDF02970
DO 445 I=t,N FDF02980
DO 445 J-I,N FDF02990
ZKL(I,d)=ZKL2(I,J) FDF03000
445 CONTINUE FDF03010
GO TO 442 FDFO3020
446 WRITE(IO.447) LEXP(K).(CZKLAF(I).I=I.NS) FDFO3030
447 FORMAT('L='.I2.SX.'CZKLAF='.3E16.6) FDFO3040
45 CONTINUE FDFO3050
RETURN FDFO3060
END FDFO3OTO
C FDFO3080
C* DGAIN DETERMINES THE DETECTOR GAIN FOR THE FILTER FDFO3090
C FDF03100
SUBROUTINE DGAIN(C,A,EV,GEN,CF,CPF,NU,NUMOO,N,NF,NS,IAP,IDPR,DPR, FDF03110
& ZKF,ZMF,AP,D) FDF03120
INTEGER NU(IO)°IQ(IO)oNUMOD(IO) FDF03130
DOUBLE PRECISION FDF03140
& C(10.20).A(20.20).GEN(20.10).CF(IO. 10).CPF(_O.20). FDFO3150
& G(20).D(20.10).P(20).Q(20).AJ(20.20).AJG(20). FDFO3160
& QD(20.10)oCFTCF(10. IO).CFTCFI(10.10).WK(460). FOFO3170
& CFTTI(10. IO).DP(20.10).ZMF(2OO.20).ZMFNUL(20.20). FDFO3180
& WL(20).WF(20.10).AP(20.20).DPC(20.20).PSI(20). FDFO3190
& APd(20.20).WFI(20).APdWF(20).PSIW(20.10).ZKF(20.20). FOFO32OO
& ZKFQ(2O.20).ZKFUF(20).W(20. tO).CPFW(10.10).CPFWT(IO, lO).FDFO3210
& CPFWTI(IO. IO).CFWTTI(10. IO).DPR(20.10).CF2TTI(10. IO). FDFO3220
& OPRSUB(20. tO)°OH(20. IO).OMSUB(10.10).Ad2(20.20). FDFO3230
& APd2(20.20).ZKF02(20°20).ZMFSUB(20.20).EV.EPS.TOL FDFO3240
DATA 10/8/ FOF03250
DO 35 K=I.NF FDFO3260
DO 5 I=I,N FDF03270
G(I)=GEN(I,K) FDF03280
5 CONTINUE FDFO3290
CALL EVAS(20_NUMOD(K).EV.P) FOFO33OO
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DO 10 I=I.N FDF03310
Q(1)=P(t),G(1) FDF03320
IO CONTINUE FDF03330
NUMOOI=NUMO0(K)-I FDFO3340
IF(NUMOD1.EQ.O) GO TO 21 FDFO3350
DO 20 d=f,NUMODI FDF03360
CALL MATPOW(A,20,N,O,Ad2,Ad) FDFO3370
CALL MATVEC(Ad,G,20,20,N,N,AOG) FDFO338O
DO 15 I=I.N FDFO339O
Q(I)-Q(I)+P(d+I),AdG(I) FDF034OO
t5 CONTINUE FDF03410
20 CONTINUE FDFO3420
21 CALL MATPOW(A,20,N,NUM00(K),Ad2,Ad) FOFO3430
CALL MATVEC(Ad,G,20,20.N,N,AdG) FOFO3440
DO 25 I=f,N FDF03450
Q(I)=Q(I)+AdG(I) FDF03460
25 CONTINUE FDF03470
O0 30 Z=I,N FDF03480
OO(I,K)=Q(I) FOF03490
30 CONTINUE FDF03500
35 CONTINUE FDFO3510
CALL VMULFM(CF,CF,NS,NF,NF.IO, IO,CFTCF,IOoIER) FDF03520
CALL LINVIF(CFTCF.NF,tO,CFTCFI.O,WK,IER) FDF0353O
CALL VMULFP(CFTCFI,CF,NF,NF,NS,IO, IO,CFTTI./O. IER) FDF0354O
CALL VMULFF(QO°CFTTI,N,NF.NS,20, IO,DP,20,IER) FDFO355O
CALL VMULFF(DP,C,N,NS,N,20,10.DPC,20.IER) FDF03560
CALL MATSUS(A.OPC,20,20,NoN.AP) FDF0357O
WRITE(IO°39t) ((DP(I,J),d=I,3),I=I,4), FOF03580
& ((AP(I.J).J=I.4).I=I.4) FOF03590
391 FORMAT('DP='/4(3EI4.4/)//'AP='/4(4E14.4/)/) FDF03600
NUSUM=O FDF03610
DO 40 K=I,NF FDFO3620
NUSUM=NUSUM+NU(K) FDF03630
40 CONTINUE FDF03640
IF(IDPR.EQ.1) GO T0 90 FOFO3650
IF((N-NUSUM.NE.O).ANO.(IAP.NE.f)) GO TO 50 FOFO3660
DO 45 I=I,N FOF03670
DO 45 d=I.NS FDF03680
O(I,d)=Dp(r,d) FOFO3690
45 CONTINUE FOF03700
RETURN FDFO3710
50 CALL MATID(ZMFNUL,20,N) FOFO3720
CALL ORTRED(ZMF,2OO,20,NS,N,N,ZMFNUL,NS,I,ZMFNUL,ZMFSUB, FOF03?30
& IRKZMF,ICOOE3,ZKNU1,WL,IQ,WF) FDFO3740
WRITE(IO.411) (IO(1).I=I.4) FDF03750
411 FORMAT('IQ='/414) FDF0376O
ICP=O FDF03770
DO 85 I=I,NS FDF03780
IF(IQ(I).EQ.O) GO TO 85 FDFO3790
ICP=ICP+I FOFO38OO
CALL EVAS(20,IO(Z),EV,P) FDFO3810
DO 55 L=t,N FDFO3820
WFI(L)=WF(L.I) FDFO3830
55 CONTINUE FDFO384O
DO 60 d=l,N FDFO3850
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PSI(d)=P(I)*WFI(d) FDF03860
60 CONTINUE FDF03870
IQIMI=IO(I)-I FDF03880
IF(IOIMI.EO.O) GO TO 71 FDF03890
DO 70 Q-I,IOIMI FDF03900
CALL MATPOW(AP,20,N,J,APd2,APJ) FDF03910
CALL MATVEC(APO,WFI,20,20,N,N,APOWF) FDF03920
DO 65 K=t,N FDF03930
PSI(K)=PSI(K).p(o+t),APOWF(K) FDF03940
65 CONTINUE FDF03950
70 CONTINUE FDF03960
71 CALL MATPOW(AP,20,N,IQ(I),APj2,APO) FDF03970
CALL MATVEC(APd,WFI,20,20,N,N,APJWF) FDF03980
DO 75 K=i,N FDF03990
PSI(K)=PSI(K).APOWF(K ) FDF04000
75 CONTINUE FDF04010
CALL MATPOW(ZKF,20,N,IO(I)-I,ZKFQ2,ZKFQ) FDF04020
CALL MATVEC(ZKFO.WFI,20,20,N.N,ZKFWF) FDF04030
DO 80 L-1,N FDF04040
PSIW(L,ICP)=pS_(L) FDF04050
W(L,ICP)-ZKFWF(L) FDF04060
80 CONTINUE FDF04070
85 CONTINUE FOF04080
CALL VMULFF(CPF,W,NS,N,ICP,tO,20,CPFW, IO,IER) FDF04090
CALL VMULFM(CPFW,CPFW,NS,ICP.ICP,IO, IO,CPFWT,IO,IER) FOF04100
CALL LINV1F(CPFWT,ICP,IO,CPFWTI,O,WK,IER) FDF04110
CALL VMULFP(CPFWTI,CPFW.ICP,ICP.NS.IO. IO,CFWTTI.IO,IER) FDF04120
CALL VMULFF(PSIW,CFWTTI,N,ICP,NS,20, IO.DPR,20,IER) FDF04130
90 WRITE(IO,457) ((OPR(I,O).O=I.3).I=I,4) FDF04140
457 FORMAT('DPR='/4(3E14.4[)/) FDF04150
CALL VMULFF(CF,CFTTI,NS,NF,NS,IO, IO,CF2TTI,IO,IER) FDF04160
CALL VMULFF(DPR,CF2TTI,N.NS.NS.20, IO.DPRSUB.20, IER) FDF04170
CALL MATSUB(DPR,DPRSUB,20, IO.N,NS,DH) FDF04180
CALL MATADD(DP,DH,20, IO,N.NS,D) FDF04190
RETURN FDFO42OO
END FDF04210
C FDF04220
C = SENSOR IS THE MAIN PROGRAM FOR SENSOR EVENT FILTER DESIGN FDF04230
C - FDF04240
SUBROUTINE SENSOR(C,A,EV,G,NU,CF,CPF,N,NF,NS, FDF04250
& ZKF,ZMF,FALL,IFAL,IDET,ICAToD) FDF04260
INTEGER NU(IO)oIQ(IO),NUMOD(IO),ICAT(IO) FDF04270
DOUBLE PRECISION FDF04280
& A(20,20),C(IO,20),G(20. IO),CF(IO, IO),CPF(IO.20)° FDF04290
& ZKF(20,20),ZMF(2OO,20),FALL(20, IO),D(20, IO),CCT(IO, IO), FDF04300
& CCTI(IO, IO),AP(20,20).WQSUB(IO.20).WOSUB2(IO,20). FDF04310
& WO(2OO,20),F(20).AF(20),.WOAF(2OO).APAF(20),WK(40), FDF04320 -
& APAF2(20),CAPAF(IO)°CAAFNI(IO,20).CAFNUL(20,20)° FDF04330
& CAFSUB(20,20),WL(20).WF(20, IO),AFALL(20.10), FDF04340
& DPR(20, tO),CPF2(IO,20),AP2(20.20),AFALL2(20,10)o FDF04350
& EPS,TOL,WOEPS FDF04360
DATA IO,EPS/B,1.D-4/ FDF04370
IDIR=O FDF04380
IF(IFAL.EQ.1) GO TO 5 FOF04390
CALL VMULFP(C,C,NS,N,NS°IO, IO,CCT,IO,IER) FDF04400
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CALL LINVIF(CCT,NS,IO,CCTI,O,WK,IER) FDF04410
CALL VMULFM(C,CCTI,NS,N,NS,IO, IO,FALL,20,IER) FDF04420
WRITE(IO,121) ((FALL(I,J),J=I,4),I=I,4) FDF04430
121 FORMAT('FALL-'/4(4E14.4/)//) FDF04440
5 CALL SEPDET(A,C,FALL,N,NF,NS,ISEP,IDET,IDIR,C,CF.G.NU,NUMOD. FDF04450
& ZKF,CPF,ZMF) FOF04460
IF(IDET.EO.1) RETURN FDF04470
CALL DGAIN(C,A,EV,G,CF,CPF,NU,NUMOD,N,NF,NS,I,0,DPR, FDF04480
& ZKF,ZMF,AP,O) FDF04490
CALL MATGEN(CPF,AP,IO,20,2OO,NS,N,N,WOSUB,WOSUB2,WO) FDF04500
WRITE(IO,132) ((WO(l,d),d=1,4),I=l,12) FDF04510
132 FORMAT('WO='/12(4E14.4/)//) FDF04520
NSN=NS*N FDF04530
TOL=O. FOF04540
00 10 I=t,NS FDF04550
DO 10 d=l,N FDF04560
WOEPS=WO(I,d)*EpS FDF04570
TOL=OABS(OMAXI(TOL,WOEPS)) FDF04580
10 CONTIhFdE FDF04590
WRITE(IO,143) TOL FOF04600
143 FORMAT('TOL=',E14.4/) FDFO46fO
DO 60 K=I,NF FOF04620
DO 15 I=I,N FDF04630
F(I)=FALL(I,K) FDF04640
15 CONTINUE FDFO4650
CALL MATVEC(A,F,20,20,N,N,AF) FDF04660
CALL MATVEC(WO,AF,2OO,20,NS*N,N,WOAF) FOFO4670
WRITE(IO,156) (WOAF(I),I=I,8) FDF04680
156 FORMAT('WOAF='/2(4E14.4/)//) FDF04690
NO=O FDF04700
DO 20 I=I,NSN FDF04710
IF(DABS(WOAF(1)).LT.TOL) NO=NO+I FDF04720
20 CONTINUE FDF04730
IF(NO.EQ.NSN) GO TO 25 FDF04740
ICAT(K)=I FDF04750
GO TO 60 FOF04760
25 ICNT=O FDF04770
00 30 I=I,N FOFO478O
APAF(1)=AF(I) FOF04790
30 CONTINUE FDF04800
35 ICNT-ICNT+I FDFO4810
CALL MATVEC(C,APAF,10,20,NS,N,CAPAF) FDFO4820
DO 40 I=I,NS FDFO4830
CAAFNI(I,ICNT)=CAPAF(I) FOFO4840
40 CONTINUE FDF04850
IF(ICNT.EO.N) GO TO 50 FOF04860
CALL MATVEC(AP,APAF,20,20,N,N,APAF2) FDFO487O
00 45 I=i,N FOF04880
APAF(I)=APAF2(I) FDF04890
45 CONTINUE FDF04900
GO TO 35 FDF04910
50 CALL MATID(CAFNUL,20,N) FDF04920
CALL ORTRED(CAAFN1,NS,N, IO.20.CAFNUL,NS.O,CAFNUL, FDF04930
& CAFSUB,IRKCAF,ICODE3,ZKNUI,WL.IO,WF) FDF04940
IF(IRKCAF.NE.I) GO TO 55 FDF04950
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ICAT(K)= 2 FDF04960
GO TO 60 FDF04970
55 ICAT(K)=3 FDFO4980
60 CONTINUE FOFO49gO
WRITE(IO,166) (ICAT(K),K=I,4) FDFOSOOO
166 FORMAT('ICAT=',413/) FOF05010
DO 65 K=I,NF FOFOSO20
IF(ICAT(K).EO.3) RETURN FDFOSO30
65 CONTINUE FDF05040
CALL VMULFF(A,FALL,N,N,NF,20,20,AFALL,20, IER) FDFOSO50
WRITE(I0,177) ((AFALL(I,O),d=I,4),I=I,6) FDFOSO60
177 FORMAT('AFALL='/6(4E14.4/)//) FDF05070
DO 68 I=I,NS FDFO5080
DO 68 "J=I,N FDF05090
CPF2(I.J)=CPF(I,O) FDF051OO
68 CONTINUE FDFO5110
00 69 I=I,N FDF05120
DO 69 _=I,N FDFO5130
AP2(I,_)=AP(I,j) FDF05_40
69 CONTINUE FOFOS150
IDIR=I FDF05160
C= IF AFALL2 IS INPUTTED TO PROGRAM. FOF05170
C= DELETE THESE NEXT 5 STATEMENTS FOF05180
NF2=NF FDF05190
00 70 I=I.N FDF05200
DO 70 J=I.NF2 FDFO5210
AFALL2(I,J)=AFALL(I,J) FDF05220
70 CONTINUE FDF05230
CALL SEPDET(AP2.CPF2.AFALL2.N.NF2.NS.ISEP.IDET.IDIR.C.CF.G. FDF05240
& NU,NUMOD,ZKF,CPF,ZMF) FDFO5250
IF(IDET.EQ.1) RETURN FDF05260
CALL DGAIN(CPF2,AP2,EV,G,CF,CPF,NU,NUMOD,N,NF2,NS,O,O,DPR, FDFO5270
& ZKF,ZMF,AP,DPR) FOF05280
WRITE(IO.127) ((DPR(I,J),j=I,4),I=I,B) FOF05290
127 FORMAT('DPR-'/6(4E14.4/)//) FDFO53OO
IDIR=O FDF05310
CALL SEPOET(A,C,FALL,N,NF,NS,ISEP,IDET,IDIR,C,CF,G,NU,NUM00, FDFO5320
& ZKF,CPF,ZMF) FOFO5330
CALL DGAIN(C,A,EV,G,CF,CPF,NU,NUMOD,N,NF,NS,O,1,DPR, FOFO5340
& ZKW, ZMF,AP,D) FDF05350
RETURN FDFO5360
END FDFOS370
C FDF05380
C, ORTRED PERFORMS ORTHOGONAL REDUCTION ON MATRIX V FDFO5390
C FDFOS400
SUBROUTINE ORTRED(V,MtV,NIV,MV,NV,OMI,NS,ICODE4,0M,OMSUB, FDFO5410
& IRANK,ICODE3,ZKNUI,WL,IQ.WF) FOFO5420
INTEGER IQ(10),ICODEI(10) FDF05430
DOUBLE PRECISION FOF05440
& V(M1V,NIV).OMI(N1V,NIV),OM(N1V,NIV),OMSUB(NIV,N1V), FDFO5450
& VK(20),W(20),WL(20),WF(20, IO),WTVK,ZKNU1,EPS,TOL,VKEPS FDFO5460
DATA I0,EPS/8,1.D-4/ FOFO5470
ICNT=O FOF05480
IRANK=O FOF05490
ICODE2=O FDF05500
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ICODE3=O FDF05510
WRITE(IO,205) FDF05520
205 FORMAT('ENTERING ORTRED') FDF05530
DO 5 I=I,NS FDF05540
IO(I)-O FDF05550
ICODEI(I)=O FDF05560
5 CONTINUE FOFO5570
DO 10 I=I,MV FOFO5580
DO 10 d=I,NV FDF05590
OM(I,d)=OMI(I,d) FDF056OO
10 CONTINUE FDFO5610
DO 95 K=I,MV FDF05620
TOL=O. FDF05630
DO 20 d=I,NV FDFO5640
VK(d)=V(K,d) FDFO5650
VKEPS=VK(d)=EPS FDF05660
TOL=OABS(DMAXI(TOL,VKEPS)) FDFO567O
20 CONTINUE FDFO5680
IF(TOL.LT.EPS) TOL=EPS FDF05690
ICODE2=ICODE2+I FDF057OO
IARG=ICODE2-((ICODE2-1)/NS)*NS FOFO5710
IF(ICODEI(IARG).NE.O) GO TO 95 FDF05720
CALL MATVEC(OM,VK,NIV,N1V,NV,NV,W) FDFO5730
NZERO=O FOF05740
DO 25 I=I,NV FDFO5750
IF(DABS(W(I)).LT,TOL) NZER0=NZERO+I FDFO5760
25 CONTINUE FDFO5770
WTVK=O. FDFO5780
DO 29 I=I,NV FDF05790
WTVK=WTVK+W(I)=VK(I) FDF058OO
29 CONTINUE FDFO5810
IF(NZERO.NE.NV) GO TO 28 FDF05820
ICODEI(IARG)=I FOFO5830
GO TO 95 FDFO5840
28 IF(DABS(WTVK).GT.TOL) GO TO 30 FDFO5850
ICODEI(IARG)=I FDFO5860
GO TO 95 FDFO5870
30 IF(ICODE3,NE.O) GO TO 35 FDFO588O
ICODE3=K FDF05890
35 DO. 40 I=I,NV FDF059OO
WL(1)=W(I) FDFO591O
40 CONTINUE FDFO5920
IF(ICODE4.NE.1) GO TO 80 FDF05930
IO(IARG)=IQ(IARG)+I FOF0594O
DO 60 I=I,NV FDFO5950
WF(I,IARG)=W(I) FDF05960
60 CONTINUE FDFO5970
80 IRANK=IRANK+I FDFO5980
WTVK=O. FDFO5990
OO 85 I=I,NV FOF06000
WTVK=WTVK+W(I)=VK(I) FOFO6010
85 CONTINUE FDFO6020
ZKNUI=WTVK FOFO6030
DO 90 I=I,NV FDF06040
DO 90 d=I,NV FDFO6050
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OMSUB(I.J)=W(1),W(d)/WTVK FDF06060
90 CONTINUE FDFO60?O
CALL MATSUB(OM.OMSUB.NIV.NIV.NV.NV.OM) FDF06080
95 CONTINUE FDFO6090
RETURN FDF06100
END FDF06110
C FDF06120
C- MATGEN GENERATES LARGER MATRIX C FROM A AND B FDF06130
C FDF06140
SUBROUTINE MATGEN(A,B,M1A,NIA,M1C.MA,NA,N,CSUB,CSUB2,C) FDF06150
DOUBLE PRECISION A(M1A,N1A),B(N1A,N1A),C(M1C,NIA), FDF06160
& CSUB(M1A,N1A),CSUB2(M1A,N1A),EPS FDF06170
DATA EPS/t.D-5/ FDF06180
DO 5 I=I,MA FDF06190
DO 5 d=I,NA FDF06200
IF(OABS(A(I,J)).LT.EPS) A(I,J)=O.DO FDF06210
C(I,Q)-A(I,J) FDF06220
CSUB(I,J)=C(I,J) FDF06230
5 CONTINUE FDF06240
IF(N.EQ.1) RETURN FDF06250
NMI=N-1 FDF06260
DO 15 K=I.NM1 FDF06270
CALL VMULFF(CSUB.B.MA.NA.NA.MIA.NIA.CSUB2.MIA.IER) FDF06280
00 10 I-I.MA FOF06290
00 10 J=I.NA FDF06300
CSUB(I.j)=CSUB2(I,J) FDF06310
C(MA,K+I,J)=CSUB(I,J) FDF06320
10 CONTINUE FDF06330
15 CONTINUE FDF06340
RETURN FDF06350
END FDF06360
C FDF06370
C= EVAS DETERMINES COEFFICIENTS P IN CHARACTERISTIC EQUATION FDF06380
C FDF06390
SUBROUTINE EVAS(N1,N,EV,P) FDF06400
REAL PDUM(IO) FDF06410
DOUBLE PRECISION P(N1).EV FDF06420
EVSNGL=SNGL(EV) . FDF06430
DO 5 K=I.N FDF06440
I=N-K+I z FDF06450
BETA=(FLO_T(IFACT(N))/(FLOAT(IFACT(N-I))=FLOAT(IFACT(-I)))) FDF06460
& -(EVSNGL--I) FDF06470
PDUM(K)=((-1.0)--I)-BETA FDF06480
P(K)=OBLE(POUM(K)) FDF06490
5 CONTINUE FDF06500
RETURN FDF06510
END FDF06520
C FDF06530
C* MULTIPLIES MATRIX BY VECTOR FDF06540
C FDF06550
SUBROUTINE MATVEC(ARRAY.V.M1.N1.M.N.RET) FDFO65BO
DOUBLE PRECISION ARRAY(M1,NI),V(N1).RET(M1) FOF06570
DO 10 I=I.M FDF06580
RET(I)=O.DO FDF06590
DO 10 _=I.N FDF06600
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RET{I)=RET(1)+ARRAY(I,j),V(J) FDF06610
10 CONTINUE FDF06620
RETURN FDF06630
END FOF06640
C FDF06650
C- AODS MATRIX B TO MATRIX A FDF06660
C FDF06670
SUBROUTINE MATADO(A.B,M1,NI,M,N,RET) FDF06680
DOUBLE PRECISION A(MI.N1),B(M1,N1),RET(M1,N1) FDF06690
DO 10 I=I,M FDF06700
00 10 G=I,N FDF06710
RET(I.J)=A(I.J)+B(I.J) FOF06720
10 CONTINUE FDF06730
RETURN FDF06740
END FDF06750
C FDF06760
C" SUBTRACTS MATRIX B FROM A FDF06770
C FDF06780
SUBROUTINE MATSUB(A,B,M1.N1,M,N,RET) FDF06790
DOUBLE PRECISION A(M1,NI),B(M1,N1),RET(M1,NI) FOF06800
DO 10 I=I,M FOF06810
o0 10 d=l,N FOF06820
RET(I,J)-A(I,d)-B(!,J) FDF06830
I0 CONTINUE FDF06840
RETURN FDF06850
END FOFO6B60
C FDF06870
C- GENERATES THE IDENTITY MATRIX FDF06880
C FDF06890
SUBROUTINE MATID(A.N1.N) FDF06900
DOUBLE PRECISION A(N1.N1) FDF06910
DO 20 ImI.N FOF06920
00 10 _=I,N FDF06930
A(I,J)-O.O0 FOFO6g40
10 CONTINUE FDF06950
A(I,I)-I.0DO FDF06960
20 CONTINUE ' FDFO6970
RETURN FDF06980
END FDF06990
C FDF07000
C" RAISES MATRIX _TO POWER K FDF07010
C FDF07020
SUBROUTINE MATPOW(A,N1,N,K,AK2.AK) FDF07030
DOUBLE PRECISION A(N1.N1),AK(N1.NI),AK2(NI,NI) FDF07040
CALL MATID(AK,N1,N) FDF07050
IF(K.EQ.O) RETURN FDF07060
DO 10 IDUM=t.K FOF07070
CALL VMULFF(A.AK.N.N.N.N1.N1.AK2.NI.IER) FOF07080 .
DO 5 I=I.N FDF07090
DO 3 d'l,N FDF07100
AK(I,j)=AK2(I.j) FOF07110
5 CONTINUE FOF07120
10 CONTINUE FDF07130
RETURN FDF07140
END FDF07150
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C FDFO7160
C* FINDS FACTORIAL OF N FDFO7170
C FDFO7180
INTEGER FUNCTION IFACT(N) FDFO7190
IFACT=I FDFO72OO
IF(N.LE.I) RETURN FDFO7210
DO 10 d-2,N FDFO7220
IFACT-IFACT*d FDFO7230
10 CONTINUE FDFO7240
RETURN FDF07250
END FDFO7260
.....
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10 3 3 0 1
- 15.0E0
O. 1.0 O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. 1.0 O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. 1.0 O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. -130.38 O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 1.0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. -983.45 O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O,
O. t.0 O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
-3752.6 O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. 1.0 O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. -10181. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O.. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. 1.0 O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. -22556. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 1.0
O. O. O. O. O. O, O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. -43683. O.
1.00 O. -I,59 O. , -1.60 O. 1.321 O.
1.04 O. -0.753 O, -0.465 O. -0. 181 O.
1.00 O. -I .01 O. -0, 123 O. -0.876 O.
- I . 30 O. 1.09 O. O. 356 O. -0. 553 O.
1.00 O. 0.00 O. 1.21 O. 0.00 O.
1.41 O. 0.00 O. 1.40 O. 0.00 O.
O.
O.
O.
O. •
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O. O. O.
1.992 1.992 1.992
O. O. O.
-3. 167 -2.012 0.000
O. O. O.
-3. 187 -0.2450 2.410
O. O. O.
2.631 -1.745 0.000
O. O. O.
2.072 -2.590 2.809
O. O. O.
-1.500 2. 171 0.000
O. O. O.
-0. 9263 O. 7092 2.789
O. O. O.
-0. 3606 -1 .102 0.000
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C FDSO002O
C PROGRAM FDSIM SIMULATES CONTINUOUS FDSO0030
C SYSTEM AND FILTER DYNAMICS FDSO0040
C FOR FAILURE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION FDSO0050
C FDSO0060
C FDSOOOBO
C INPUT: NSYS - NUMBER OF SYSTEM STATES FDSO0090
C NFIL - NUMBER OF FILTER STATES FOSO0100
C NS - NUMBER OF SENSORS FDSO0110
C NA - NUMBER OF ACTUATORS FDSOO120
C NF - NUMBER OF FAILURE EVENTS FDSO0130
C IAS - (-I) FOR ACTUATOR FAILURES FOS00140
C (-2) FOR SENSOR FAILURES FDSOO1SO
C OMU - ACTUATOR INPUT FREQUENCY FDSOO160
C ISR - SAMPLING RATE (HZ} FDSO0170
C NTSEC - INTEGRATION FREQUENCY (HZ) FDSOO180
C IFAIL - # OF FAILED ACTUATOR OR SENSOR FDSOO190
C TFAIL - TIME OF FAILURE (SEC) FDSOO*O0
C TLAST - TIME OF SIMULATION FD*O0210
C A - SYSTEM MATRIX FOSO0220
C BS - CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS MATRIX FOR SYSTEM FDSOO230
C CS - MEASUREMENT MATRIX FOR SYSTEM FDSOO240
C CF1 - MATRIX OF OUTPUT ERROR DIRECTIONS FOR FDSOO250
C ACTUATOR FAILURES (COLUMNS ARE VECTORS) FDSO0260
C D - DETECTOR GAIN FDSOO270
C X - INITIAL STATES FDSO0280
C FDSO0290
C OUTPUT: RE - TRANSFORMED OUTPUT ERROR VECTOR FDSO0300
C FDSO0310
C FDSO0330
C FDSOO*4O
DIMENSION A(20,20),BS(20. IO),BF(20, IO).CS(10.20),U(lO), FDSOO350
& D(20, IO),CFI(IO, IO),X(40),XDOT(40),E(IO),S(IO, IO). FDSO0360
& R(IO, IO),CFTCF(IO, IO).CFTCFI(IO. IO),CFTTI(IO, lO), FDSO0370
& WK(40),WK1(40.9),RE(IO),C1A(24),CF(lO,20), FDSO0380
& XS(20),XF(20).YS(IO),YF(IO), FDSO0390
& TIME(SOOO),REI(5OOO),RE*(5OOO),RE3(5000) FDSO0400
EXTERNAL FCN FDSO0410
DATA IN, IO,IND,TOL,EPS,NW/9,10, I,0.OOI,I.E-4,40/ FDSO0420
COMMON A,BS,BF,CS,CF,D.E.U,OMU,NSYS,NFIL,NA,NS FOS00430
CALL PLOTS(IDUM,IDUM, 18) FDSO0440
READ(IN,S) NSYS,NFIL.NS,NA,NF.IAS,OMU,ISR,NTSEC,IFAIL,TFAIL,TLAST,FDSO0450
& ((A(I,J),J-l,16),I-l,16), FDSO0460
& ((BS(I,d),j=l,8),l-1,16), FDSO0470
& ((CS(I,d),J-I,16),I-I,8), FDSO0480
& ((CFl(I,d),d-l,3),I-1,8), FOSOO490
& ( (D( I, d). d = 1.3), I- 1, 16), FDSO0500
& (X(I),I=1.32) FDSOOSIO
5 FORMAT(613/FlO.4/I3/*I3.2FlO.4/32(BFIO.4/),lS(8F10.4/), FDSOO520
& 16(BFlO.4/),8(3E16.6/).I6(SEI6.6/),4(BFfO.4/)) FOSO05*O
WRITE(*O,7) NSYS,NFIL,NS,NA,NF,NTSEC,IFAIL,TFAIL,TLAST, FDSO0540
& ((CFI(I,J),J-I,4).I-I,4), FDSOOSSO
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& ((D(I,d),d=1,4),I-1,4) FDSO0560
7 FORMAT('NSYS=*,I2,'NFIL=',I2,SX,'NS=',I2.BX,'NA='.I2,SX,'NF'',I2/ FOS00570
& "NTSEC-',I3,5X,'IFAIL,'.I2,5X.'TFAIL,',FB.3.SX,'TLAST," FDSO0580
& FB.3/'CFl-'/4(4E14.4/)/'O='/4(4E14.4/)/) FOS00590
NE=NSYS+NFIL FDSO0600
DO 10 I'I,NFIL FDSO0610
DO 10 d=I,NA FOS00620
BF(I,d)'BS(I,d) FDSO0630
10 CONTINUE FDSO0640
DO 12 I=I,NS FDSOO650
00 12 d-I,NFIL FDSO0660
CF(I.J)-CS(I,J) FDSO0670
12 CONTINUE FDSO0680
DO 20 I=IoNS FDSO0690
00 15 J-I.NF FDSO0700
S(I,d)=O. FDSO0710
15 CONTINUE FDSO0720
S(I,l)-1.0 FDSO0730
20 CONTINUE FDSO0740
IF(IAS.EQ.2) GO TO 21 FDSO0750
CALL VMULFM(CF1,CF1.NS,NF.NF.IO, IO,CFTCF,10,IER) FOSOO?60
CALL LINVIF(CFTCF,NF,IO,CFTCFI,O,WK,IER) FDSO0770
CALL VMULFP(CFTCFI,CF1,NF,NF,NS,IO, IO,CFTTI,IO,IER) . FDSO0780
CALL VMULFF(S,CFTTI,NS,NF,NS, IO. IO,R,IO. IER) FDSO0?90
GO TO 24 FOSO0800
21COSGAM=CFI(2,1)/SORT(CFI(2.1).*2+CFI(3,1)*-2) FDSOOBIO
SINGAM=CFI(3,1)/SORT(CFI(2,1)--2+CFI(3,1)**2) FDSO0820
R(1,1)=1.0 FDSO0830
R(I,2)=O. FDSO0840
R(1,3)=O. FDSO0850
R(2,1)=0. FDSOO860
R(2.2)=COSGAM FDSO0870
R(2,3)=SINGAM FDSOC880
R(3,1)=0. FDSO0890
R(3,2)=-SINGAM FDSO0900
R(3.3)=COSGAM FDSO0910
24 T=O. FDSO0920
CALL FCN(NE,T,X,XDOT) FDSO0930
WRITE(IO,25) FOS00940
25 FORMAT(2X,'TIME',lBX,'El',12X,'E2'.I2X,'E3'/) FDSO0950
WRITE(IO,30) T,(RE(I),I=I,3) FDSO0960
30 FORMAT(2X,F6.3,1OX,3EI4.4) FDSO0970
ILAST=INT(TLAST)=NTSEC FDSO0980
IPLOT=ILAST FDSO0990
NFE=NTSEC/ISR FDS01000
INDEXE=O FDS01010
IWRT=O FDS01020
00 50 K=I,ILAST FOSOI030
TEND=FLOAT(K)/FLOAT(NTSEC) FDSOI040
C* NEXT STATEMENTS FOR DATA-SAMPLING ONLY FOS01050
C INDEXE=INOEXE+I FDS01060
C IF(INOEXE.NE.NFE) GO TO 38 FDSOI070
C NPI=NSYS+I FDSO1080
C 00 32 I=I,NSYS FDSOI090
C .XS(I)=X(I) FDSOIIO0
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C 32 CONTINUE FOS01110
C DO 34 I=NPJ,NE FDS01120
C XF(I-NSYS)=X(1) FDS01130
C 34 CONTINUE FOS01140
C CALL MATVEC(CS,XS,10,20,NS,NSYS,YS) FOS01150
C CALL MATVEC(CF,XF,10,20,NS,NFIL,YF) FDSO1160
C CALL VECS(YS,YF,IO,NS,E) FDSO1170
C INDEXE-O FDSO118O
38 IF(T.LT.TFAIL) GO TO 4t FDSOllgO
IF(IFLAG.EO.t) GO TO 4t FDSO12OO
IFLAG=I FDSO1210
IF(IAS.EQ.2) GO TO 415 F0501220
DO 40 I=I,NSYS FDS01230
BS(I,IFAIL)=O. FDS01240
40 CONTINUE FDS01250
GO TO 41 FDS01260
4t5 DO 416 J=I,NSYS FDS01270
CS(IFAIL,d)=O. FDSO1280
416 CONTINUE FDSO1290
41 CALL DVERK(NEoFCN,T,X,TENDoTOL,IND,CIA,NW,WKI,IER) FDSO13OO
IF(IND.LT.O .OR. IER,GT.O) GO TO 62 FDSO1310
CALL MATVEC(R,E,IO,10,NS,NS,RE) FDSO1320
TIME(K)=T FDSO1330
REI(K)=RE(1) FDSO1340
RE2(K)=RE(2) FDSO1350
RE3(K)=RE(3). FDS01360
IWRT=IWRT+I FDS01370
IF(IWRT.NE.5) GO TO 50 FDS01380
WRITE(IO,45) T,(RE(I),I=I,3) FOSO13go
45 FORMAT(2X,FB.3, lOX,3E14.4) FDS01400
IWRT= 0 FDSO1410
50 CONTINUE FDS01420
CALL PICTUR(8.0,3.0,'TIME(SEC)',9,'ERROR(FT)',9, FDSOt430
& TIME,REJ,IPLOT,O.,O, FOS01440
& TIME,RE2,IPLOT,O.,1, FDS01450
& TIME,RE3.IPLOT,O.,2) FDS01460
CALL ENDPLT(12.0,O.O,999) FDS01470
GO TO 100 FDS01480
62 WRITE(IO,?5) FOS01490
75 FORMAT('IND<O OR IER>O') FDS01500
100 STOP FDS01510
END FDS01520
C FDSO1530
C FOS01540
C FDS01550
SUBROUTINE FCN(NE,T,X,XDOT) FDSO1560
DIMENSION X(NE),XDOT(NE),U(IO),BS(20, IO),BF(20, IO),CS(IO,20), FDS01570
& XS(20),XSDOT(20),XF(20),XFDOT(20),YS(IO),YF(IO), FDS01580 '
& E(IO),D(20, IO),A(20,20),AXS(20),AXF(20),BSU(20), FDS01590
& BFU(20),DE(20),AXFBFU(20),CF(lO,20) FDS01600
COMMON A,BS,BF,CS.CF,D,E,U,OMU,NSYS.NFILoNA,NS FDS01610
U(1)=EXP(_O.2.T).SIN(OMU.T) F0501620
U(2)=EXP(-O.2-T)-SIN(OMU*T) F0501630
U(3)=EXP(-O.2.T).SIN(OMU-T) FDS01640
NPI=NSYS+I FDS01650
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DO 5 I=I,NSYS FDSOI660
XS(1)=X(I) FDS01670
XSDOT(1)-XDOT(I) FDS01680
5 CONTINUE FDS01690
00 10 I=NP1,NE FDSO17OO
XF(I-NSYS)=X(I) FDSO1710
XFDOT(I-NSYS)=XDOT(1) FDSO1720
10 CONTINUE FDSOI730
CALL MATVEC(A,XS,20,20,NSYS,NSYS,AXS) FDSOI740
CALL MATVEC(BS,U,20, IO,NSYS,NA,BSU) FDS01750
CALL VECP(AXS,BSU,20,NSYS,XSDOT) FOSO1760
CALL MATVEC(A,XF,20,20.NFIL,NFIL,AXF) FOSO1770
CALL MATVEC(CS,XS,10,20,NS,NSYS.YS) FOSO1780
CALL MATVEC(CF,XF,tO,20,NS,NFIL,YF) FDS01790
CALL VECS(YS,YF,10,NS,E) FDSO18OO
CALL MATVEC(O,E,20,10.NFIL,NS,DE) FDSO1810
CALL MATVEC(BF,U,20, IO,NFIL,NA,BFU) FDSO1820
CALL VECP(AXF,BFU,20.NFIL,AXFBFU) FOSO1830
CALL VECP(AXFBFU,DE,20,NFIL,XFOOT) FDSO1840
00 15 I=i,NSYS FOSO1850
XDOT(I)=XSDOT(I) FOS01860
15 CONTINUE FDSO1870
DO 20 I=NPI,NE FDSO1880
XDOT(I)=XFOQT(I-NSYS) FDSO1890
20 CONTINUE FDSO19OO
RETURN FOSOlglO
END FDSO1920
C FDSO1930
C FOSO1940
C FOSO1950
SUBROUTINE MATVEC(ARRAY,V.M1,NI,M,N,RET) FDSO1960
DIMENSION ARRAY(M1,N1),V(N1),RET(M1) FOSO1970
DO 10 I=I,M FDSO1980
RET(I)=O. FDSO1990
DO tO d=l.N FOSO2OOO
RET(I)=RET(I)+ARRAY(I,J)*V(d) FOSO2010
10 CONTINUE FOSO2020
RETURN FDS02030
END FOSO2040
C FDSO2050
C FDSO2060
C FDSO2070
SUBROUTINE VECP(V1,V2,N1,N,VADO) FDSO2080
DIMENSION VI(NI),V2(NI).VADO(NI) FOSO2090
DO 5 I=I,N FOS02100
VADO(1)=VI(1)+V2(1) FDS02110
5 CONTINUE FDSO2120
RETURN FDSO2130
END FDSO2140
C FDS02150
C FDS02160
C FOSO2170
SUBROUTINE VECS(V1,V2,N1,N,VSU8) FOSO2180
DIMENSION VI(NI),V2(N1),VSUB(NI) FOSO2190
DO 5 I=I,N FDSO22OO
VSUB(I)=VI(1)-V2(1) FDS02210
5 CONTINUE FOSO2220
RETURN FDSO2230
END FDSO2240
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16 10 3 3 3 1
20.0
64
192 2 1.0 2.01
O. 1.0 O. O. O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. 1.0 O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. 1.O O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. - 130.38 O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 1.0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. -983.45 O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. 1.0 O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
-3752.6 O. O. O. O- O, O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. I.O O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. -10181 • O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. I.O O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. -22556. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. 1.0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O- O. O. O. O. -43683. O.
O. O. O.
1.992 1.992 1.992
O. O. O.
-3. 167 -2.012 0.000
O. O. O.
-3. 187 -0.2450 2.410
O. O. O.
2.631 -1.745 0.000
O. O. O.
2.072 -2.590 2.809
O. O. O.
-1.500 2. 171 0.000
O. O. O.
-0. 9263 O. 7092 2. 789
O. O. O.
-0.3606 -I.102 0.000
I.00 O. -I.59 O. -I .60 O. 1.321 O.
1.04 O. -0.753 O. -0.465 O. -0. 181 O.
1.00 O. -1.01 O. -0.123 O. -0.876 O.
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- 1 . 30 O. 1 • 09 O. O. 356 O. -0. 553 O.
1 .00 O. 0.00 O. 1.21 O. 0.00 O.
1.41 O. 0.00 O. 1.40 O. 0.00 O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O. 177572E+02 O. 584335E+00 0. 105736E+01
O. 584315E+00 O. 894988E+01 -0. 195613E+01
O. 105725E+01 -0. 195635E+01 0.886879E+01
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O. 214951E+01 O. 981505E+01 O. t4997 IE+02
O. 193940E+02 0.627022E+02 . 0.635415E+02
-0. 560015E+O1 -0. 487336E+01 O. 688610E+01
-0. 383867E+02 -0. 486003E+02 -0. 240117E+01
-0.586796E+01 0.119337E+01 0.746371E+01
-0.207824E+02 O. 113480E+02 O. 575569E+02
0.575753E+01 -0.985363E+01 -0. 165995E+02
-0. 884495E+02 O. 587169E+02 -0. 434314E+03
O. 294047E-01 O. 362257E+01 O. 562981E+02
-0.484272E+03 O. 117701E+04 0.569748E+03
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O.
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